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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this study is to provide empirical evidence on how owners of family 
managed firms affect bank leverage in family owned and managed firms. In addition, to 
assess the effect when a control right of the controlling owner exceeds cash flow rights which 
give rise to  the agency problem in a bank with ownership concentration on bank leverage. 
Using cross-country bank-level data from Caprio et.al (2007) the study revealed  that family- 
owner managed  firms  tend to have lower debt and this supports the hypothesis that bank 
leverage is likely to be lower in owner managed family firms. Furthermore, using equity ratio 
as an alternative indicator of bank leverage, the result indicates that family owner managed 
firms have a positively significant impact on bank leverage. This suggests that in a family- 
owner managed firm there is always a higher level of equity to finance the asset of banks in 
order to make sure the asset base of the bank is strong. This further strengthen the position of 
our result when using liability ratio in term of leverage where the inverse relationship 
between leverage and family-owner managed firms is interpreted as dependence on equity 
rather debt. Therefore, this implies that family owner managed firms prefer lower bank 
leverage.   
Moreover, higher control rights than cash flow rights give rise to a  serious agency 
problem, as a result  the control rights of the controlling owner exceeds cash flow rights has a 
significant positive relationship on bank  leverage in term of liability ratio, and  a significant 
negative relationship on  bank leverage in term of equity ratio. This finding  which uses the 
liability ratio in term of leverage further explained   that bank leverage is higher when control 
rights of the controlling owner exceeds cash flow rights. The result also suggests that for 
firms where control rights of the controlling owners exceed cash flow rights, the equity is 
lower so they will prefer debt financing because of the fear of losing control.  Situations like 
this are associated with an over- reliance on debt due to large shareholders being unwilling to 
dilute their ownership, generally this known as non-dilution of entrenchment.  This implies 
that bank leverage is higher if control exceeds cash flow rights. However, this study 
recommends that there should be more dilution of ownership in family-owner managed firms 
so those minority owners are not exploited. In addition, controlling shareholder should not 
allow excessive building up of bank leverage because too much debt may lower bank 
valuation. Consequently, banks need to be better regulated furthermore excessive leverage 
has been identified as one of the reasons for the current financial crisis.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
     INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the study 
The current financial crisis has highlighted the risks of unregulated privatisation. 
During the sustained period of high growth over the past decade or so, unfettered risk-taking 
by banks has been one major factor contributing to the outbreak of the financial crisis (e.g., 
see Coricelli et al, 2009; de Haas and van Horen, 2009), necessitating huge government bail-
outs of banks. Accordingly, capital management of banks has come under increasing scrutiny 
in recent times. But it is only recently that the question of optimal bank capital structure has 
begun to be addressed (e.g., see Diamond and Rajan (2000)). Following the recent surge of 
literature for corporate governance of non-financial firms (La port et al, 1999) some 
researchers (e.g. Caprio et al., 2007) have also highlighted the potential role of governance on 
bank valuation. In particular the paper examines whether strong shareholder’s protection laws 
could improve bank governance and therefore bank valuation. More recently Mehran and 
Thakor (2009) examine the link between bank capital and bank valuation. Researchers are 
however not aware of any research exploring the possible role of corporate governance of 
banks on a bank’s capital management. Using cross-country bank-level data, this study aims 
to bridge this gap in the literature. The analysis of bank leverage is very important because 
there is a need to understand the relationship between leverage decisions and the ownership 
structures of banks which have been emphasised in the wake of the current financial crisis 
that shows the risk of lending booms which result in the downturns of the global economy.   
Caprio et.al (2007) claimed that ownership structure is an important mechanism for 
governing banks and the same most important aspect of corporate control mechanisms that 
determine the governance of non-financial firms also determine bank operations. Laeven and 
Levine (2008) revealed that ownership structure and shareholder protection laws have an 
impact on the ability of owners to influence risk.  The authors argue further that shareholders 
with higher voting rights than cash flow rights have the greater power and incentives to 
change corporate behaviour than minority shareholders. Theory also suggests that how much 
a bank will deleverage will surely depend on how much leverage bank equity owners are 
willing to tolerate in future time and the level of leverage that will be profitable in the 
business with an  increase in cost of capital.  Based on this perspective, ownership structure 
determines the ability of owners to change bank risk in response to standard risk shifting 
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incentives and to incentives from official regulations. Consequently, the importance of banks 
to national economies is emphasized by the fact that banking is universally a regulated 
industry and banks have access to government safety nets. In addition, the activities of banks 
have a number of intrinsic risks that can pull down the whole financial system of a nation’s 
economy. The intrinsic risks include, among others, operating with high leverage which can 
cause financial distress and bankruptcy. It is therefore very important that banks have strong 
corporate governance in order to protect the interests of all the stakeholders and thus to better 
align the interests of bank managers, shareholders and customers.     
 Furthermore, sizeable corporate governance literature on non-financial firms focuses 
heavily on firms’ ownership structure (e.g., Claessens et al. 2000, 2002). The question is 
whether banks are different from these non-financial firms. Following Caprio et al. (2007), 
This analysis focuses on two key ownership variables, namely,  when  a family is a 
controlling owner and also whether control rights of the controlling owner exceeds the 
corresponding cash flow rights. This analysis however differs from Caprio et al. (2007) in 
that it considers the role of bank ownership structure on capital structure.  
Moreover, conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders as well as those 
between controlling and minority shareholders lie at the heart of the corporate governance 
literature. With the exception of the US and the UK, ownership concentration is commonly 
high in all parts of the world. One important characteristic of the prevalent ownership 
structure around the world is the dominance of family ownership. Often in family controlled 
firms the controlling owner and the manager belong to the same family, which helps to align 
the interests of the manager with the controlling owner. It is also argued that owner-managed 
family firms tend to be more risk-averse than others, even at the highest level of 
concentration, which in turn may generate a negative relationship between family ownership 
and leverage structure and may be a  contrast  to the conventional wisdom of a positive 
relationship. The conflict between the controlling owner and the minority owners however 
continues to persist, thus generating some negative impacts on bank valuations. Second, as 
control rights of the controlling owner often exceeds his/her cash flow rights. Higher control 
rights may give rise to serious agency problems and are often associated with pyramid 
ownership structures and crossholding. Such situations are associated with an over-reliance 
on debt due to large shareholders being unwilling to dilute their ownership, generally known 
as non-dilution of entrenchment. Claessens et.al (2002). Against this background, this study 
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examines how family owner-managed firms affect bank leverage.  In addition, to assesses 
how excessive control rights in relation to cash flow rights may influence bank leverage.  
 The banking crisis has highlighted the adverse effects of much capital. In this context, 
the present study empirically examines if there is a link between ownership and bank capital. 
Our analysis particularly focuses on two ownership variables, namely, incidence of family 
ownership and also if control rights exceeds cash flow rights. This is because these two 
ownership variables have important implication for corporate governance of bank. Firstly, 
one can argue that family bank is more risk averse than others and therefore are less likely to 
have lower loan and lower capital structure than non-family banks. Secondly, the 
management of bank where control exceeds cash flow rights is more likely to take riskier 
decision since financial risks involved for them would be less than when cash flow rights are 
higher. We use bank-level cross-country data available from Caprio et al. (2007). Our results 
provide support to the two hypotheses not only for the full sample but also in some sub-
samples. In particular, importance of control exceeds for cash is upheld in the OECD 
countries while importance of family ownership for capital structure is particularly 
pronounced in the non-OECD countries. This is because incidence of family ownership is 
less pronounced OECD countries. 
In particular, estimates suggest that family- owner managed firms tend to have a 
lower liability. This result is consistent with Daly and Dollinger (1992) and Anderson et al. 
(2002). In addition, with equity ratio the result indicates that family- owner managed firms 
have a positively significant impact on equity ratio so that a family- owner managed firms 
tend to have higher equity to finance. This result is consistent with James (1999). 
 Furthermore, the coefficient of control exceeds cash flow right (CEC) has a 
significant positive relationship on bank leverage in term of liability ratio. This implies that 
bank leverage is higher if control exceeds cash flow rights. This result is consistent with 
Driffield et.al (2007). In addition, this also indicates that when control rights of the 
controlling owner exceeds cash flow rights there will be fear of sharing of control and being 
interfered by others and this often delays the decision of company to go for public offer. 
Consequently most companies will prefer to raise debt capital Pandey (1999).  Furthermore, 
the coefficient of control exceed cash flow right (CEC) has a significant negative relationship 
on bank leverage in term of equity ratio as an alternative indicator of bank leverage. This 
10 
 
finding further buttress the result when using liability ratio in term of bank leverage  which 
reveals that bank leverage is higher when a control right of the controlling owner exceeds 
cash flow rights. This result also suggest that firms where control rights of the controlling 
owners exceeds cash flow rights, the equity is lower they will prefer debt financing because 
of fear of losing control.  Situations like this are associated with an over- reliance on debt due 
to large shareholder being unwilling to dilute their ownership, generally this known as non-
dilution of entrenchment. Our finding is consistent with Claessens et.al (2002).   
 
 1.2 Objectives of the study.  
In summary, this study involved two main objectives;  
To examine how family owner managed firm affect bank leverage in a situation when 
family controlled firms the controlling owner and the manager belong to the same family, 
which helps to align the interests of the manager with the controlling owner. 
 To assess how control rights of the controlling owner exceeds cash flow rights which 
give rise to agency problem, and to what extent this impacts on bank leverage. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
LITERATURE REVIEW ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
2.1 Introduction 
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the principal-agency theory otherwise known 
as the shareholder model is generally considered as the starting point for any debate on 
corporate governance. The agency theory sets out as a basis that better corporate governance 
should lead to higher stock prices and or better long-term performance, because managers are 
supervise well, and agency problems are minimized, leading to a decrease in agency cost and 
information asymmetry. However, Gompers et al. (2003) and La portal eta al. (2002) argue 
that firm performance may have little to do with agency explanation. The studies that 
examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance have 
emphasized such governance practices as board composition, board size, CEO turnovers and 
ownership of shares, disclosure and transparency and shareholders rights. As a result of these 
different views on the issue of corporate governance, the following will provide definitions of 
this term.  
2.2 Definition of corporate governance 
There is no universally held or single definition of corporate governance and certainly 
no definition that all countries agree on Mayes et al. (2001). As a result, corporate 
governance can be defined and practiced in different way globally depending upon the 
relative power of owners, managers and provider of capital Craig (2005). Generally, 
corporate governance can be defined as a procedure, customs, laws, policies, and institutions 
that affect the way a corporation is directed, administered or controlled. It can also be the 
relationships between stakeholders and the goals that are already laid down for the 
corporation to follow, in which the principal stakeholders are the following: shareholders, 
management, and the board of directors. In addition, employees, customers, creditors (banks 
and bond- holders) are stakeholders. The important objective of corporate governance is to 
ensure the accountability and transparency of those involved in the policy of organisation 
through mechanisms that will remove or reduce principal- agent problem.    
In term of corporate governance mechanism and structure, Keasey and Wright (1993) defined 
corporate governance as a framework for effective monitoring, regulation and control of 
companies which allows alternative internal and external mechanisms for achieving the laid 
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down objectives. These mechanisms include those internal to the firm and its organisation, 
and those external to the firm such as statutory requirement and the operation of the markets. 
The internal mechanisms are the board composition, managerial ownership, and non-
managerial shareholding which involve institutional shareholding. The external mechanisms 
are the following: statutory audit, the market for corporate control effectiveness in hostile 
takeovers, and stock market evaluation of corporate performance. However, the advantages 
of the entire corporate governance framework will be determined by the interaction among 
these governance mechanisms. Using the agency theory approach, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
defined corporate governance as a process in which a supplier of finance to firms assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment. The authors posited that corporate 
governance is mainly concerned with principal agency problem between ownership and 
control. The authors emphasized that corporate governance should be seen as a set of 
mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by 
insiders. In addition, Cadbury (2002) defined corporate governance as the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled by shareholders. In addition, in terms of attainment of 
company goals, objectives and performance, OECD (1999) view corporate governance as a 
set of relationship between the company’s management, its board, its shareholders and 
stakeholders. It also provides the structure through which objectives of the company are set 
and the means of attaining those objectives, and monitoring performances. 
2.3 The Significance of corporate governance: 
Different authors have their own view for the reason for the introduction of 
governance in corporations; the following are the view of various academic scholars and 
international organisations for the significance of corporate governance system in firms.   
Denis (2001) posited that the fundamental perception and understanding of the field of 
corporate governance originated from the fact that there are potential problems associated 
with separation of ownership and control which was inherent in the modern corporate form of 
organisation. As a result, the author viewed corporate governance as a structure with a set of 
institutional and market mechanisms that induce self-interested managers (controllers) to 
maximize the value of the residual cash-flow of the firm on behalf of its shareholders (the 
owners). Every author writing a paper on corporate governance always focused on this 
fundamental perception and understanding which field originated from; dated back to 1776 
during that year Adam Smith had written about professional managers in his Wealth of 
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Nation. He found that as the manager of other people’s money, it cannot be expected they 
should watch over the wealth anxiously. In addition, (1932) Berle and Means revealed that 
this problem made the corporation not performed well. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
expanded ideal of the previous authors, and then proposed the theory of firm in which they 
apply agency theory to Modern Corporation. The author explained that a manager who owns 
anything less than 100 percent of the residual cash-flow rights of the firm will tend to have 
conflict of interest with outside shareholders. Based on these studies, several authors in the 
field of finance and economics have carried out studies to define measure and minimise these 
conflicts and their impact on firm value. 
  Moreover, the US government, investors, and academics focused on corporate 
governance after Enron filed for bankruptcy in December 2001. The Enron scandal later 
followed by another scandal at Tycon, Global Crossing, ImClone system, and WorldCom. 
The US congress acted against the scandal by enacting the Sabarnes-Oxyle Act (SOX) which 
was signed into law in 2002. Benton (2007) revealed that some people said that SOX was 
overreaction to the scandals. While it has some good points, the costs of implementation are 
excessive. Benton (2007) also found that corporate governance became important because of 
globalization, such as the move toward International Accounting Standard Board (IASB). 
This body based in London, is committed to developing single set of high quality, well 
understood and enforceable global accounting standard. In addition, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision which is part of the Bank of International Settlement (BIS), published a 
guidance that was entitled ‘’ Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisation’’ 
This was based on papers published by the committee in 1999 and also the principles for 
corporate governance issue by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) in 2004. The reason for this guidance was to help ensure the adoption and 
implementation of sound corporate governance practices by banking organisations globally. 
According to the author he argues that this is not intended to establish a new regulatory 
framework over the already existing national legislation, and regulation or code. 
  In addition, Mallin, et al. (2005) explained several reason for development of 
corporate governance in the UK, firstly the collapse of corporate business, both in the 
financial and non-financial sectors such as Polly Peck, BCCI, and Baring.  These suggest the 
ideal of emphasis on control to safe guard asset. Secondly the method of changing share 
ownership particularly in the US and UK, which led to greater concentration of share 
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ownership for institutional investors like pension funds, and insurance companies. For 
example in the UK institutional investors own about 80 percent of the UK stock market, but 
in US the percentage is less. Thirdly, the institutional investors are increasingly to 
diversifying their portfolios and investing in overseas. As a result they are looking for way in 
which their investment will be protected. Fourthly, with recent technological advances in 
communications and markets, ideas can be spread widely and quickly, institutional investors 
are globally linked to each other more and are forming common views on the main aspect of 
investment like corporate governance. Fifthly, as a result of diversity of businesses, such as 
family-owned firms and state-owned enterprises increasingly and they are seeking for 
external funding, whether through domestic or international sources. Corporate governance 
play the important role of providing confidence in those companies and this will help to 
obtain external funding at a reduced cost. Finally, good corporate governance brings 
confidence into the stock market and in the economic environment as a whole, by creating a 
more attractive environment for investment. 
  Furthermore, OECD (2004) revealed that corporate governance served as one of the 
main element in improving economic efficiency, growth and enhanced investor confidence. It 
provides a proper incentive for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the 
interest of the company and its shareholder and to enhance effective monitoring. The 
availability of an effective corporate governance system, with Individual Corporation and 
across an economy assisted in providing a degree of confidence that is necessary for proper 
functioning of the market economy. For these reason the cost of capital is reduce and firm are 
encourage to used resources more efficiently, thereby underpinning growth.   
  Finally, Pati (2005) argue that for effective corporate governance, the boards and 
managers are accountable for pursuing it. The role of effective corporate governance is of 
great significance for society as whole. It enhanced the efficient use of scarce resources both 
within the organisation and larger economy, there is flow of resources to those sectors where 
there is efficient production of goods and services and the return is adequate to satisfy the 
demand of the stakeholders. It assists the managers to remain focused on enhancing 
performance and ensure they are replaced if they fail to perform. It forced the organisation to 
comply with laws and regulations in the corporate environment, and it helped the supervisors 
to regulate the economy objectively without favouritism and nepotism. In addition, effective 
corporate governance enhanced the confidence of investors, which encouraged them to 
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remain with the economic system. It decreased the risk of capital flight from an economy and 
increased the flow and variety of capital in the economy, from this result, the cost of capital 
becomes lower for companies.  
2.4 Different forms of corporate governance. 
 Corporate governance takes various forms which happen as a result of differences in 
the structure of corporate organisation in difference countries, in area of regulation by the 
state, suggestions from various professional bodies, ownership structure and control, board 
composition and structure.  Below are the outcomes of various academic scholars, and 
international organisations findings toward the filling the gap in different aspect of the 
literature in corporate governance of corporations.    
2.4.1 Regulation by state and Professional bodies 
  The Corporate governance structure relies on the legal, regulatory, and institutional 
environment. Moreover, factors like business ethics and corporate awareness of the 
environment and societal interest of the communities in which the company is operating can 
also affect its reputation and the long- term success. In addition, corporate governance is also 
affected by the relationships among those that are involved in the governance system, 
controlling shareholders, which can be individuals, family holding block alliance, cross 
shareholding, and other companies acting through a holding company. Creditors play the role 
of external monitors on corporate performance, while employee and other stakeholders 
contributing to the long-term success and performance of the company and the role of the 
government create the overall institutional and legal structure for corporate performance. The 
duties of each of these actors and their interactions differ among OECD countries and among 
non-OECD countries. The law, regulation, voluntary adaptation all play a part and the most 
important is the market forces. OECD (2004) revealed that supervisory, regulatory and 
enforcement authorities should have the authority, integrity, and resources to fulfil their 
duties in a professional and objective manner. Moreover, their rulings should be timely, 
transparent and fully explained.  Winter (2002) explained that in US, the Enron failure 
brought a number of legislative initiatives like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of July 2002. Further, 
in the EU a report by the high level group of company law experts on corporate governance 
reform was issued in November 2002. The main motivation of the report was to coordinate 
and strengthen efforts undertaken by and within members’ state to improve corporate 
governance. The main objective was to improve shareholder protection and restore 
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confidence in the system, this high level group’s recommendations was clearly inspired by 
the development of corporate governance development in the UK.  Denis (2001) argues that 
the regulatory system in US is very much intertwined with the political system. 
Balasubramanian et al (2008) conducted a survey on Indian corporate governance practices 
and based primarily on responses to a 2006 survey of 370 Indian public companies and the 
authors revealed that Indian corporate governance rules appropriate for large companies, but 
need to improve in area of related party transactions. This is   not strong for small companies 
and executive compensation is low using the US as a standard.   
In UK Demmirag et al. (2000) explained that the Cadbury report in 1992 introduced 
the first of many new corporate governance guidelines. These were followed by the 
recommendation of the Greenbury and Hampel committees which was in turn incorporated 
into the combined code. These were followed by further reports which provide guidance as to 
implementation. The authors believed that the Cadbury report took a narrow view about 
corporate governance, by only looking into financial aspect of accountability. As a result, 
there is other policy development which recognised that corporate governance is not only 
about control. It includes developing and implementing effective accounting and business 
polices, and long- term strategic objectives.  In addition, the authors explained further that, 
there was promulgation of various code of corporate governance there was debate about 
appropriate form and scope of corporate governance regulation and there should be three 
models for the regulation of UK listed companies. These are an auditing council, a 
commission for audit, and a UK SEC. At the end of the discussion, only a few people 
supported that corporate governance regulation should be assumed by audit regulatory body. 
The study supported that regulation should be by an independent body with statutory powers, 
like UK SEC. There was also debate on developing a corporate governance code by 
promoting disclosure on internal control and risk management which was an area that the 
Cadbury report neglected. This is also consistent with Mill, (1977) who posited that adequate 
internal control system can help company not to be expose to major business risk. 
 Moreover, Andrianova and Shortland et.al (2008) used a suitably modified locational 
model of banking to analyse the influence of institutions, such as deposit contract 
enforcement, in describing the share of government owned banks in the banking system given 
cross-country evidence. Using empirical analysis the authors found that institutional factors 
have more influence in determining the share of the state banks than political or historical 
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ones. They recommended that instead of privatizing or subsidizing state banks, government 
of countries should developed institutions that will bring up the development of private 
banking. The recommendation is consistent with. Yakasai (2001) on his conceptual 
explanation on corporate governance in a third world country, and author believes that the 
government has influence in the corporate structure of the banking industry.  
The professional bodies also contribute their own suggestions toward the development 
of sound corporate governance system in corporations. The following are their suggestions; 
Company Secretary (2001) revealed that, in UK, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) 
publicly revealed that they have written to several companies which combined the roles of 
chairman and chief executive, asking for an explanation.  In addition, under the London 
Stock Exchange combined code, listed companies need to explain departures from the code. 
Moreover, these explanations always state that the board considers it to be best interest of the 
company. The National Association of Pension Funds (NAFP) has criticised more than 
twenty leading UK companies for failing to comply with the combined code. The National 
Association of Pension Fund has revealed that 54 percent of companies surveyed failed to 
ensure the independence of the remuneration committee. The Association also revealed the 
chairman and chief executive duties and failure to reduce director’ contract to one year as 
was recommended. The association said that a significant number of companies are failing to 
comply with the code and there is need for improvement. According to NAPF News (2000) 
the association manage to gain a delay in the introduction of the Financial Reporting Standard 
(FRS) 17, under the FRS 17 companies would have to value their pension scheme assets at 
market value, and their liabilities using the prevailing yield on high quality corporate bonds. 
The association has warned that the new standard will pressurise pension funds to reduced 
volatility by increasing their holding of UK bonds at the expense of other assets, such as 
equity. The Chairman of the association posited that this standard does little to increased 
transparency and may seriously damage pension provision in UK. Other association like 
Local Authority Pension Funds Forum (LAPFF) has also argues that shareholders want CEO 
remuneration to be related to industry benchmarks and open to shareholders review.  
Moreover, company secretary (2001) explained that the shareholder voting working 
group has come out with a report examining the process of lodging proxies and shareholder 
voting at company meeting. The report focused on how the processes can be streamlined to 
improve the level and quality of voting in the UK for both domestic and overseas 
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shareholders. Finally, a recommendation was made that there should be development of an 
agreed ‘’ code of practice for implementation by all parties in the voting process’’ In addition, 
ISS report (2001) the Teacher Insurance Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities 
Fund (TIAA-CREF) has appeal to NASDAQ and the New York Stock Exchange to require 
shareholder approval of stock option plans with limited and clearly defined exceptions. The 
TIAA-CREF also submits proposal on issue of poison pill to fourteen companies and one 
proposal on board independence to four companies.  The Association query two companies 
on the issues of dead-hand poison pills. At the end, fourteen of the companies have complied 
with TIAA-CREF’s request. 
Furthermore, Andres and Vallelado, (2008) revealed that the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) have send  noticed  to the public the need to study, understand, 
and improved the corporate governance of banking sector. They advocate that a governance 
structure should compose of a board of directors and senior management. The key message of 
BCBS show that good corporate governance increases monitoring efficiency. In addition, the 
committee posited that corporate governance is necessary because is a foundation for a sound 
financial system, and to enhance the economic development of a country.  
2.4.2 Ownership structure and control in corporate governance. 
 Ownership and control is very important in the framework of an effective corporate 
governance system as a result, the following are the outcomes of different academic scholars 
on ownership structure and control in corporate governance. Fama (1980) examined the 
separation of security ownership and control in a typical large corporation. He firstly set aside 
the presumption that corporations have owner in any meaningful sense. He revealed that the 
two function attributed to the entrepreneur are management and risk bearing which are 
treated as separate factors in a contract called Firm. The firm is disciplined by the 
competition from other firms. This brings new ideas for the whole workforce and individual 
members for efficient monitoring the performance of the entire work force and individual 
members. The author further explained that there are discipline and opportunities by the 
market for their services both within and outside the firm for managers and individual that 
participate in the firm. In addition, Fama and Jesen (1983) revealed that the contract 
structures of organisations are separate by ratification and monitoring of decision from 
initiation and implementation stage. The authors viewed organisation as a contract, and set up 
a mechanism for controlling agency problem in decision process. They argues that  separation 
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of decision and risk bearing function take place in an organisation as a  result of benefits of 
specialisation of management and risk bearing and also because of effective common 
approach to control the agency problem. Moreover, Jensen and Meckling (1976) used the 
empirical model from theory of agency and finance to develop a theory of ownership 
structure of the firm. They defined an agency relationship as a contract in which one or more 
persons (the principal) involved another person (agent) to perform some services and 
functions on behalf and delegating of duties and authority to the agent. The agency cost level 
is based on statutory and common law, human ingenuity in devising contracts and there is 
high incentive for any person to reduce agency cost.  
 Morck, et al (1988) investigates the relationship between management ownership and 
market valuation of the firm using an empirical analysis approach. The results shows that 
there a significant non-monotonic relationship, with valuation (Tobin’s Q). The Tobin’s Q 
firstly increases, and finally increases slightly as ownership by board of directors rises.  For 
older firms the result shows that valuation (Tobin’s Q) is lower for firms that is control by a 
member of the founding family than when it been control by officer that does not related to 
the founder. Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998) examined the combined effects of ownership 
structure and board composition on corporate performance. The authors found that insider 
ownership, board composition, and firm performance are related. This finding was 
inconsistent with Demsetz and Len’s (1985) that found a curvilinear relationship between 
managerial ownership and performance. In addition, there was weak evidence of a curvilinear 
relation between the proportion of outside directors and performance which is the same 
finding by Weisbach (1988) who found that the institutional ownership and board 
composition can be replaced for managerial ownership has higher effect on board 
composition than vice-versa and it show that insider may remained as controller of the board 
of director as a result of high performance. 
  Crawford, et al. (1995) tested for the deregulation hypothesis that posited that bank 
CEO compensation which includes salary and bonus, stock option and stock ownership have 
influence on performance as banks management became less regulated. Using empirical 
evidence, the authors found that there was a significant increase in pay-performance 
sensitivities from their 1976-1981 regulation sub-samples to their 1982-1988 deregulation 
sub-samples. These increases are shown for salary and bonus, stock options, and common 
stock holding. In addition, they observed that increase in pay- performance relation was 
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linked with increased capitalization ratio of banks, and consistent with provision for incentive 
for wealth creation. 
 Moreover, Thompson and Wright (1995) evaluated the corporate restructuring 
transaction as a new development of corporate governance, especially to determine how far it 
changes the Agency problem link with management control. The forms of restructuring make 
a great contribution with firms in which the governance problems deal with diffused 
ownership and control. The authors revealed that change in ownership and financial structure 
may bring higher gain in shareholder value and operating performance. They recommended 
that there was a need for flexible approach to governance under which of the forms used 
should take the account of such specific factors as the firm’s product life-cycle circumstances. 
 Nevertheless, La portal, et.al (1999) used the data on ownership structures of large 
companies in the 27 richest economies to investigate the fundamental controlling 
shareholders of these firms. The empirical analysis of the sample revealed that, except in 
economies with very good shareholder protection, few of these firms are widely held. The 
findings do not match Berle and Mean’s view on Modern Corporation. Instead, these firms 
are controlled by families or the state. The equity control through financial institution is very 
rare and the controlling shareholders have power over firms in excess of their cash flow 
rights. This happens through the use of hierarchy and taken part in the management activities. 
 Hart (1995) used conceptual analysis in examining the corporate governance debate, 
and provided some recommendations which will be useful as a guide to policy makers. The 
first section of his paper reviewed the situation under which the corporate governance issue is 
necessary and used public quoted company as a case study. The author revealed that 
corporate governance occurs wherever contracts are incomplete and agency problem occur. 
He explained that board of directors, proxy fights, large shareholder, hostile takeovers and 
financial structure (choice of debt) are used as mechanism for controlling management 
(governance mechanism).  In addition, the author argues that market economy can be 
obtained efficient corporate governance by on its own. He made the following suggestion 
from his finding for policy implication: the statutory rule is weak; therefore Cadbury’s 
approach of trying to enlighten and persuade companies to make amendments in their 
corporate governance was definitely the best. Cadbury’s recommendations should be 
observed as an overview of corporate governance, although Cadbury was promoted, and it is 
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necessary to make sure that the already laid down mechanisms can operate freely to provide 
actual checks and balances on managerial behaviours. 
  Furthermore, Agrawal and Knober (1996) assessed empirically the seven mechanisms 
in controlling the agency problems between managers and shareholders. The mechanisms are: 
shareholding of insiders, debt policy, the managerial labour market, and market for corporate 
control. The authors provided an empirical evidence of how each mechanism depends on 
each other in large firms. They found that a cross-sectional OLS regression of firm 
performance can be misled, and they revealed the relationship between four of the 
mechanisms were each is included in a separate OLS regressions. The four mechanisms are 
the insider shareholders, outside-directors, debt and corporate control activity. Certainly, the 
effect of insider shareholding vanishes when the whole mechanisms are included in a single 
OLS regression, and the effect of debt and corporate control activity vanish too when 
estimations are made in a simultaneous method approach.  
 Caprio et al (2007) examined the impact of the ownership structure of banks and 
shareholder protection law on bank valuations on controlling for differences in banking 
regulation. Using Ordinary Least square (OLS) regression in samples from different countries, 
the authors found that except in a few countries with very strong shareholder protection law, 
banks are not widely held, rather banks tend to be controlled by a family or state. The result 
on valuation shows that larger cash-flow rights by the controlling owner boost valuations, 
weak shareholders protection laws decrease bank valuations and increase cash-flow rights 
reduces the negative effects of weak shareholders protection laws on the valuations. These 
results show that expropriation of minority shareholders in banks is global, and the laws can 
play a role in restraining this expropriation. Therefore, the issue of cash-flow rights is an 
important mechanism for governing banks. 
 Glassman and Rhodes (1980) conducted an empirical analysis study on the relative 
performance of owner controlled and bank managers. The study focuses upon cost, growth, 
and profit. The authors test for non-linearity to determine empirically at what percentage of 
ownership performance differences become obvious. The result shows that owner controlled 
banks give higher profit rate than manager controlled banks, and the effect of manager 
control on growth and cost is not as clear. The test for non-linearity shows that the effects of 
ownership control are not evident until relative high level of ownership control exists. 
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Moreover, Spong and Sullivan (2007) provided a survey of research which was carried out on 
how different structures of corporate governance influence bank performance. Using multi-
variance regression in analysing the data, the authors found that ownership stake for hired 
manger can help to improved bank performance similar with reduction in principal-agent 
problem claimed in theory of finance. The board of director have a positive effect on bank 
performance when directors have a significant financial interest in the bank. While the 
financial position of managers and the directors have significantly influence their way toward 
risk taking and banks risk trade-offs. The authors recommended that ownership and wealth 
relationship can surely significantly affect banks overall performance. Banks with weakness 
in ownership and management must be willing to improve their operation and the bank 
regulators to indentify the corporate governance problem, and find the corrective measured in 
solving the problems. 
 Benito and Conyon (1999) used empirical modelling to examine the determination of 
directors’ compensation in UK quoted companies. The new idea in this study was focused on 
the governance mechanisms that determined pay outcome. The authors result shows that the 
directors’ compensation was associated to corporate performance but its effect was 
overshadowed by company size variable. The pay-for-performance estimate become 
quantitatively higher over the sample period and this finding was consistent effect has been 
found using USA data.  The study did not reveal the adoption of either a remuneration or 
nomination committee or of separation of the positions of CEO and chairman in influencing 
the pay awards. The authors were able to differentiate finding of a cross sectional relationship 
between pay and the corporate structure. The method used make the cross-sectional 
correlation insignificant and the impact of internal boardroom control system surely relate to 
the feature of individual companies. The authors recommended that the policy recommended 
by Cadbury committee and other organisation should be examined carefully in using it to 
solve problems in corporate governance operation of UK companies.  
  In addition, Weir and Mcknight (2000) empirically revealed the same finding with 
Benito and Conyon (1999) that there was no evidence to support the efficiency of internal 
governance structure as recommended by Cadbury and there was impact between the quality 
of director and performance. The authors recommended that external control mechanism was 
more effective than internal ones and there should be policy debate about effectiveness in 
different governance mechanism. Denis (2001) used the paper titled twenty-five years of 
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corporate governance research and counting to make his own contribution to issue of 
corporate governance.  He notices that there was lack of understand on the method in which 
the various corporate mechanism interact with one another and other features of the firms and 
economies. He recommended that researchers need to assess firms and their governance 
method in the way of amendment and adaptation, because of nature of corporation that have 
change with time and it will continue. The more developed economies should improve the 
efficiency of their economies by showing the important role that corporate governance play. 
 Finally, under the ownership structure, La bruslerie and Latrous (2007) examined the 
ownership structure and debt leverage of French firm by using empirical test. The authors 
revealed the following; at low level of ownership, controlling shareholders used more debt in 
order to increase their voting power and disallow unfriendly takeovers attempts. At a level 
when ownership reached certain point, controlling shareholders’ objectives converge further 
to those of outside shareholders. In addition, the authors found that the fear of financial 
distress will make the controlling shareholders to decrease the firm’s leverage ratio.   
2.4.3 Ownership Structure and Earning Management. 
The link between ownership and earning management in firms is very important 
because the manipulation of firm’s financial earnings is either direct or by indirect accounting 
methods. This may happen when a firm cannot meet investor expectations in the period of 
volatile earning. Consequently, earning management is considered to be misleading and thus 
fraudulent. This change may follow the entire accounting standard and laws and this activity 
cannot take place without the influence of ownership structure of the firms. As a result the 
impact of ownership on earning management is an important area in corporate governance of 
firms. Against this background, some authors have expressed their view on the effect of 
ownership structure and earning management of firms.  
Existing literature argues that financial reporting is of higher quality when firms have 
stronger corporate governance mechanism and when there is greater demand for quality 
financial reporting.  To this end, Wang (2006) highlighted the link between founding family 
ownership and earnings quality distinguishing between the entrenchment effect and the 
alignments effect. This indicates that at higher level of family ownership there will be 
entrenchment effect on the supply of earning quality, or alignment effect on the demand for 
earning quality. The author revealed that founding family ownership is link with higher 
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earning quality that is lower abnormal accruals, higher earnings in formativeness and less 
persistence of transitory component in earning. Moreover, the author also posited that there is 
nonlinear relation between family ownership and earning quality. This occur as a result of an 
inverted U-shape relationship between family ownership and earning quality with evidence 
from the study this shows that family firms report earnings of higher quality than non-family 
firms up to certain level of ownership (67.44% in the abnormal accruals analysis, 57.88% in 
the earning in formativeness analysis, and 58.72% in the analysis of persistence of transitory 
losses). This indicates that on average family firms report earning of higher quality than–non-
family firms. However, when family ownership exceeds certain level (about 58%-67%) 
family firms start to report earnings of lower quality than non-family firms.  
Bhaumik and Gregoriou (2010) examined the literature on issues such as why family 
firms are found in various business organisations. The authors focused on the mechanisms by 
which family retain control over firms and the incentives for the families in control to 
expropriate other stakeholders by way of tunnelling. In addition, the authors found evidence 
on issue of earning management in family firms. The authors suggest that for the fact that the 
literature on family control is rich, the contexts in which empirical evidence are undertaken is 
relatively few. As a result, the authors recommended that there is need to expand it to other 
contexts especially in form of cross-country comparison of relative effect of agency conflicts 
and institutions on these issues.  
  Furthermore, Xu and Nguyen (2010) empirically revealed that firms with dual class 
ownership structure may have lesser earnings management activities than firms with single 
class structure. The authors claimed that firms with dual class, earnings management 
activities have a positive effect with managerial cash flow rights and negative effect with 
managerial voting rights. Furthermore, divergence between voting and cash flow rights has a 
negative effect on earning management. However, switching the sample of firms from dual 
class structure to single class structure earnings management activities is higher through the 
switching.     
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2.4.4 The legal enforcement in corporate governance:  
 The level of legal protection of investors in any country is an important factor in 
determining the development of the financial market of company in that country. The 
systematic differences in structure of law and enforcement among various countries in area of 
historical trend of their laws, level of corruption, and the quality of their enforcement will 
surely determine the difference in financial development. As a result, these are the findings of 
authors toward the study of legal protection and enforcement in corporate governance of 
different countries. 
La portal, et al. (1998) examined the legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders 
and creditors, the origin of the rules and quality of enforcement in 49 countries. Using 
empirical analysis the result revealed that common law countries have the strongest, French 
countries have the weakest, and the German-and Scandinavian-civil- law countries are at the 
middle. In addition, the authors found that concentration of ownership of shares in largest 
public companies was negatively related to investor protections, and the same with 
hypothesis that small, and diversified shareholders are not likely to be recognized in countries 
that cannot protect their right. Klapper and Love (2004) used current data on corporate 
governance (CG) ranking in firms across 14 developing markets. Using empirical evidence 
the authors found that there was variation in firm- level of governance in the sample and the 
firm-level of governance was lower in those countries that have weak legal systems and firm 
level of corporate governance should take seriously for countries with weaker legal system. 
In addition, better corporate governance was correlated with higher operating performance. 
Johnson, et al. (1999) empirically used the Asian financial crises to revealed how legal 
institution affected corporate governance on the depreciation and stock market. The authors 
found that managerial agency problem can make countries with weak legal system loss the 
confidence of investor and in a cross-country regression, corporate governance variables 
enumerate more of the variation in exchange rate and stock market performance during the 
Asian crises than macroeconomic variables.  The author found that the protection of minority 
shareholder right was one of the main reasons for depreciation and stock market declines 
during the crises. 
  La portal, et al. (2000) examined the level of protection by law on investors, both 
shareholders and creditors from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders 
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of firms. The authors explained the differences in law and how effective in implementation 
across countries, given the origin of these differences, enumerate their consequences, and 
examined the strategies of the corporate governance reform. The authors posited that legal 
approach was more meaningful way to understand corporate governance and its reform   than 
the conventional differentiations between bank-centered and market-centered financial 
system.  Furthermore, La portal, et al. (2002) formulated a model of the effects of legal 
protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by controlling shareholder on 
the valuation of firms. The model was tested empirically using sample of 539 large firms 
from 27 developed economic countries. The results revealed that, higher valuation of firms in 
countries with well protection of minority shareholders, and firms with higher cash-flow 
ownership by controlling shareholders. The finding of this study was consistent with 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985). The study also contributed to the theoretical framework on 
the effects of corporate ownership structure on valuation (Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and 
Morck, et.al (1988). In addition, Shleifer and Vishny, (1997) examined the corporate 
governance with special focused to the importance of legal protection of investor, and 
ownership concentration in corporation around the world. According to the authors, corporate 
governance deals with agency problem, the separation of management and finance, the 
question of corporate governance was how to assure the supplier of capital that they get 
return on their investment.  The authors proceed forward, by posited that agency problem 
give an opportunities for the managers to run away with supplier’s of capital  fund or used 
them on irrelevant project with well documented. In the absent of governance it will be 
failure, as a result of the above, legal protection of investors rights, was one of important 
element of corporate governance. The concentration ownership through large share holders, 
takeover, and bank financing are general method of control that can help investors to get back 
their money. Even though large investors can be assist effectively in providing solution to 
agency problem, but they may be inefficient in redistribution of the wealth from other 
investor to themselves. 
2.4.5 Cross Country Analysis of corporate governance: 
 There are several authors’ problems and findings to the issues of corporate 
governance structure using both developed and developing economies as a case study. 
McGee, (2008) conducted a study in eight Asian countries, but China and Japan are not 
included based on, certain corporate governance guidelines as indentified by OECD, World 
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Bank, and IMF and examined how these guidelines are being used in some Asian countries. 
The author found that none of the countries scored an average of fifty percent in the analysis 
based on the corporate governance guidelines, particularly in the area of equal treatment of 
shareholders, disclosure of interest, disclosure standard, and independent audit. The high 
score of India and Korea was not surprised, India was known for bureaucracy and corruption, 
and the companies are making effort on the issue of corporate governance. Korea has an 
opportunity for capital for the companies and because of the Korean economy. Vietnam 
which have low score as a result of been a new entrance to the market, and private sector was 
still at rudimentary stage, with high growth rate. The author recommended that the score will 
get better with times, but there are both internal and external pressures to improve the Asian 
countries corporate governance.  
 Moreover, Morck and Nakamura (1999) explained that the history of Japanese 
corporate ownership is necessary due to the fact that on its critical examination, it tend to 
undermine the argument that Japanese have a complex ‘alternative’ corporate governance 
system. A group of companies associated with stable inter-corporate shareholdings called a 
keiretsu. Any keiretsu in which a bank act as a central role is called a bank group or financial 
keiretsu. The authors empirically analysed the banks and corporate control in Japan. They 
explained that poor liquidity cash flow, poor stock market performance and job creation all 
these  predict banker appointment to be member of boards of bank group firms. In addition, 
banks also act in the interest of shareholders, this happen when dealing with firms in bank 
group.  The authors further explained that corporate governance mechanisms apart from 
oversight by banks will be necessary in these firms. Using empirical analysis of a large 
sample of Japanese firm, the authors found that Japanese bank are primarily in the short term 
interest of creditors when having business with firm outside bank groups, and corporate 
control mechanisms other than bank oversight appear to be essential in these firms. In 
addition, their findings are the same with banks ‘Propping’ up trouble bank group firms. The 
authors recommended that bank oversight need does not lead to maximizing corporate 
governance value.   
  In Korea, Baek, et al. (2002) assessed the importance of corporate governance in 
determining firm value during the 1997 Korean financial crises. Using an empirical approach, 
the authors revealed that Chaebol (business Group) firms with a higher ownership 
concentration by unaffiliated investors observed a smaller reduction in their share value.  In 
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addition, the firms with higher disclosure quality and alternative sources of financing also 
suffer less contrast. The Chaebol firm with concentrated ownership by family shareholders 
experience a larger drop in their equity. The firm in which controlling shareholders’ voting 
right is over their cash flow rights borrow more fund from the banks and are highly 
diversified and also have lower returns. The reorganisation of Cheabol firms brings a positive 
and significant higher return, but those noticed with diversification have a significant 
negative result. These results suggest that the owner-managers of Chaebols at times pursue 
their own private interest during the period of expansion of the investment at the expense of 
other shareholders’ interests. In contrast non-Chaebol firm with diversifying expansionary 
action experience an insignificant positive return. The authors revealed that change in firm 
value during such crisis was a function of a firm-level in corporate governance measure and 
owner-managers incentives. In addition, Choi and Hassan (2005) examined the effect of 
ownership and governance on bank performance by looking at the post financial crisis period 
of the Korean commercial bank industry and found out whether the foreign investor as part of 
ownership structure had any significant effect on the bank’s performance. Through empirical 
investigation, the authors found that the extent of the foreign ownership level, not mere 
existence of foreign ownership has significant positive effect on the bank return, and 
significant negative effect with bank risk. The number of outsider board directors does not 
have any significant effect on performance.  
 Moreover, Claessens (1997) empirically revealed how the Czech and Slovak 
Republics mass privatization schemes used a voucher programme with competitive bidding 
process to change the corporate governance of a large number of firms. The author found that 
more ownership had an impact on higher equity prices.  A large number of ownership by 
local investors was associated with higher equity prices and a large number of foreign owners 
did not have higher equity prices. These implied that control by these investors involved cost 
for minority shareholders by reducing firm efficiency. Finally, the author found that equity 
prices were lower initially for those firms in which the bank sponsored the investment funds 
with large a stake. This implies that an investment that the bank sponsored will be facing a 
conflict of interest. 
 Reinhard (2003) overviewed the German corporate governance through economic 
perspective by noticing that German corporate governance was different from Anglo-Saxon 
countries because the system was regarded as a standard example of an insider-controlled and 
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stakeholder-oriented system. The author revealed the following as a result of different 
developments and recent changes in the corporate governance system. The systems function 
based on cross-ownership and shareholder concentration and multiple relationships between 
the shareholders and the companies in question. The reason for this feature as being highly 
ambivalent is that German corporate governance system for some time can be regarded 
mainly for the interest of the active stakeholders and at the expense of others, especially the 
outsider investors. Also the reform assists in improving   the traditional system by examining 
it in a systemic context. The fundamental structure that was the set of incentives, disallowing 
of stakeholders to secure their interest and opportunities and a transition to a more modern 
capital market outsider based model is not yet seen.  The author recommends that the only 
option is to transit to the Anglo-saxon model of market-based corporate governance, not 
because it is better than the old system but the old system cannot be restored.  
 Gorergen and Renneboog (2008) provided an overview to the recent development of 
German corporate governance system. They found   that the German corporate governance 
system are characterise by market for partial control, large shareholders, and bank/creditor 
monitoring a two-tier system (management and supervisory). The board is determined by 
shareholder and employees on supervision on the board. The system is with the disciplinary 
product market and the corporate governance rules based on EU control together with 
German code and legal doctrine. The level of corporate governance efficiency is based on 
stakeholder value maximization, and the relationship between ownership and profitability has 
changed. The German CEOs seem to have the highest total cash pay in Europe and pay- for 
performance relationship is determined by large shareholder control. Furthermore, Ekehart 
and Heisenberg (1999) noticed that German transparency legislation (WpHG) is not adequate 
to achieve the objective of transparency as stated by the Europeans Commission and the 
German parliament. Then in comparing to developed economies, the German stock market is 
dominated by large shareholders due to a proxy vote and board membership. Against this 
backgrounds, the authors empirically studied  the German corporate governance system and 
revealed that low transparency of control was likely to increase the cost of capital to affect 
German corporation relative to their international competitors listed in the market that are 
more transparent. The performance of the corporation will be determined by bank control. 
The authors recommended that transparency is necessary to let investors know where to 
invest and who to control over voting rights. In addition, Drobetz, et al. (2003) empirically 
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conducted a study on corporate governance and expected stock return, in which they used 
Germany as a case study. The authors found a positive relation between the corporate 
governance rate (CGR) and firm value, and expected returns are negatively correlated with 
the CGR and any investment method that bring high-CGR firms, and allow low-CGR to 
bring abnormal returns of about twelve percent on annually during the samples period. 
 Furthermore, Chirinko, et al. (1999) examined the impact of share- ownership, 
creditor-ship and networking by institutions on Dutch non-financial firms, and empirically 
tested for the effectiveness of various mechanism of corporate control. The authors revealed 
that the Dutch systems of corporate governance are not similar to Anglo-saxon and the 
German counterpart, in the following way. There are ways to limit the voting power of 
shareholders and the structure on ground by put a lot of weight on the role of the supervisory 
board.  The authors found evidence to support the ideal that share-ownership by financial 
institutions was important in Dutch corporate governance. Then also the role of share-
ownership by financial institutions, especially bank conglomerate indirectly for large 
creditors and for insider control by networking. In addition, the authors found a non-linear 
relationship between firm performance and ownership by banks. This indicates that the role 
of shareholder was limited in Netherlands. There was a significant positive relationship 
between ownership by insurance companies and pension funds and the probability of 
networking. 
 Melis (2000) evaluated the Italian corporate governance system in area of ownership 
and control, functioning of the board, executive remuneration and the role of the banks 
market for corporate control, and block-holders. The author found that the Italian corporate 
governance is consisting of poor market orientation, and apparently absent of market for 
corporate control. The banks have a role of corporate external financing, the ownership and 
control was fully of the present of block-holders. The active investor are able to monitor the 
senior management effectively, as a result of this, the minority shareholder are to be the 
victims of block-holder and the minority shareholders’ right are pull down by the Draghi 
reform. The authors recommended that further research should be carried out on how to 
develop the board structure, taking into consideration the innovation of board statutory 
auditors and involvement of executive committee as forms of two-tier board structure. 
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 Moreover, Tam (2000) examined the models of corporate governance for Chinese 
companies and the study revealed that the following major corporate governance issue have 
to be resolved:  Chinese’s large state owned partially privatised, state enterprise sector   have 
been decrease in area of contributing to industrial output, dominance in urban and 
employment in the main industries and the access to bank finances. The author found that the 
current condition of Chinese state enterprises corporate governance does not matter in term of 
development and performance, it clearly shown that the method used from Anglo-American  
model of corporate governance have not been working as expected. It is expected that China 
will continue to follow its successful marketisation process and open door policy in order to 
ensure that the competitive market as initial condition could be attained in the future. Bai, et 
al. (2002) empirically revealed the following question concerned the corporate governance 
and firm valuation in China. Does a firm’s corporate governance affect its market value? Are 
shareholders in china are ready to pay a premium for good governance standard? And how is 
the premium compared with that of other emerging market?  The authors found that better 
governance companies according to the index used are link with higher market stock market 
value, good corporate governance is very important in China’s emerging stock market and 
Chinese investors are ready to pay a significant premium for better governance standard. The 
authors made the following recommendations: The Chinese regulatory authorities should 
make use of the results of this study to formulate the best practice code guided toward the 
Chinese institutional background, and current capital development level. In addition, the firm 
should put more effort to improve their market performance and maximizing shareholders’ 
wealth, followed the method used by market leaders, and make improvement in areas that 
will have greatest impact on their relative corporate governance system.   
 In addition Cooke and Sawa (1998) examined the debate of corporate governance that 
was going on around the world with more emphasises on Japan which was credit-based 
financial system which involved the intercompany shareholdings, intercompany director-ship 
and bank. The question is, with globalization of trade whether the corporate governance 
system of credit-based financial system will be converging with Anglo-Saxon over a period 
of time. The authors made following the suggestion that, there is need for strengthening the 
position of statutory auditors, by making them and the board of statutory auditors to be more 
independent of management. In addition, there is need for separation of board members under 
the unitary board system in Japan; this is between the non-executive directors and executive 
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directors with main role of non-executive being the planning and monitoring of management 
strategies. There is need for activation of board of directors by reducing the number of 
directors and dispensing management committee. Frijns, (2006) explained that in the past few 
years there was an increasing in numbers of Japanese firm voluntarily breaks away for 
example the case of Sony. The author has the same question with the Cooke and Sawa (1998) 
but empirically claimed that well governed firm are significantly out-performed poorly 
governed up to fifteen percent per annual. Then using overall index indices in the study to 
determine how well the companies are governed. The authors found that not all categories are 
important, but financial disclosure, shareholder rights, internal control and remuneration are 
very important for stock price performance. The authors discovered that other provision 
toward board accountability, market for control, and corporate behaviour are not so important. 
  In Thailand, Alba, et al. (1998) discovered that the following are the problems facing 
the corporate financial structure of Thailand this include: Weakness in corporate governance 
structure, and this contributed to the Thailand financial crises. Also the long-term funds from 
local sources for firms are scarce due to lack of institutional investors and the firms mainly 
relied on bank financing. Against this background, the financing and corporate governance 
structure of large corporation in Thailand have lead to inefficient investment with excessive 
diversification and decrease in profit over the past few years. The authors used empirical 
evidence to shows that there are signs of deterioration in corporate performance before the 
crises, productivity growth is slow down, and leverage is high in compared with international 
standard.  The authors recommended that large corporation need to reduce their financial 
vulnerability to economic problem and corporate governance needs to improve in order to 
enhance the efficiency of the investment. 
 Nevertheless, Bauer, et al. (2003) empirically examined whether good corporate 
governance leads to higher common stock returns and enhanced firm’s value in Europe. The 
result shows a positive relationship between performance variables and corporate governance 
variable, this relationship weaken substantially after adjusting for differences country. 
Contrary to Gompers et.al (2003) that found a negative relationship between governance 
standards and earning based performance ratios.  
 However, in UK and US Tylecote and Ramirez (2006) empirically used corporate 
governance and innovation in comparing UK with US. The author asked the question that,   
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how well does UK corporate governance and financial system (CG & FS) support and 
motivated toward innovation? Each CG &FS focused with four challenges which vary by 
sectors such as novelty, reconfiguration visibility and spill-over. The High novelty in 
technologies and market required high industry-wide professional, and the need for radical 
change in configuration need strong pressure for shareholder value. The authors revealed that 
Low visibility of innovation process need shareholder engagement, and high spill-over to and 
from stakeholders required whole stakeholders’ inclusion. The author made a conclusion that 
the UK CG &FS was rated higher than US. This result is from the recent field survey and the 
rating which is an indication of well account for the relative R&D intensity and specialization 
of UK owned firms.  
  In addition, Dremirag, et al.  (2000) used conceptual approach to overview the 
corporate governance with reference to (Berle and means, 1932, Tricker, 1984) that the 
problems of corporate governance in listed companies are well-know and long established. 
Further, they posited that many scandal that happen in the 1980s resurrected the debate on 
how best to ensure that managers accountable to shareholders that continue at present day. 
The publication of Cadbury report in 1992 introduced the first of many new corporate 
guidelines. This was followed by the recommendation of Greenburg and Hampel committees, 
which was later incorporated into the combined code. The Turnbull reports give guidance for 
companies using the requirement of the combined code with attention to internal control. This 
development of corporate governance was defined as financial accountability under Cadbury 
approach that has the interest of shareholders in mind and was also make sure by allowing the 
managers to exercise enterprise in term of risk-taking and innovation. The authors 
recommended that the regulation of corporate governance in UK will change for better at this 
point of development. The authors made the following contribution to the issue: By examined 
the effect of policy given to the companies, and evaluate the important of the policy for future 
developments regarding the regulation of corporate governance. There is also  need for policy 
to be know by regarding the important  of the objective of corporate governance, through 
awareness of the type of governance mechanism available and the interaction that exist 
between these objectives and mechanism.   
 Moreover, Dasaraju (2008) overviewed the code of corporate governance in emerging 
economies with reference to India, and compared the system with other developed countries. 
The author revealed that India was having good corporate governance mechanism, and 
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disclosure practices are on the same level with world counterpart .Then the author argue that   
India was not having corporate governance failure as it occurred in other developed countries 
like UK and US. India has made several voluntary innovations to increase the performance 
and efficiency of corporate governance. The author recommended that that there was need to 
improved corporate investor confidence of the companies in India.  Balasubramaian, and 
Khanma (2008), empirically identify areas where corporate governance of India was 
relatively strong and weak, where regulation are either relaxed or strengthened and whether 
cross-sectional relationship between corporate governance index and performance 
measurement.  The authors found that, the level of obeying the legal norms is very high in 
most areas, but not fully completed. India corporate governance rules seem to be suitable for 
larger companies, but used some strengthen in area of related party transaction and relaxation 
for some companies. The executive compensation was low compared to US standard. Also 
the authors revealed that there is a positive relationship for the entire overall governance 
index. For index for shareholder right is significant positive with profit of the firms, and with 
firms that have potential for growth. The Sub-index for board structure (board independence 
and committee’s structure) disclosure board procedure and related party transaction are not 
significant. The non-result of board structure contradicted to other current studies. The 
authors recommended that India’s legal requirements are too strict to the extent that obeying 
the rule excessively does not produce valuation.  
 Furthermore, Pati (2005) used empirical approach to investigate post implementation 
scenario of corporate governance policies in India banking, which happen after the 
recommendation of Advisory Group (2001) and others, which brought difference results.  
The study used  correlation and ordinary least square estimator and the author found that 
corporate governance issues has been developed with ownership structure with withdrawal of 
safety net decrease of pre-emptive norms, and  more exposure to market discipline. In 
addition, there is serious implementation of difference measure that required for making sure 
for better governance in banks in India. The same reforms happen in financial sector of 
corporate governance structure in UK.  Mallin, et al, (2005) used conceptual approach in 
reviewed the post Cadbury committee report development in UK corporate governance 
provision, the position play by institutional and strategic investors. Also the practice of 
corporate governance in Europe as continent, and the UK and US are compared, along with 
roles of banks and capital markets. The authors revealed that the  used of international 
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accepted accounting and auditing standard have assist and in making sure that UK have a 
high level of transparency and disclosure in the financial sector happen to reflect in the 
corporate governance structure. While the institutional investors have been active in laying 
their programme for strong share ownership in companies which they invest, and there are 
lay down stipulated behaviour consistent with incentives of management of strong quality 
firm which does not try to exploit the advantage of   information.  The corporate governance 
of EU and US reform proposal are compared with prospect for convergence in procedures 
examined. The author suggested that the proposal of capital regulation for banks in Basel II 
will likely to decrease competition in financial sector. 
 Moreover, in Latin America Reyes (2007) used functional analysis approach to 
revealed that the reason for the region not to practice the corporate governance system of US. 
The author found that lack of separation between ownership and control in Latin American 
companies was the main reason for them deviating from principle of corporate governance 
design for market system. In the region there was evidence of lack protection of minority 
shareholders and other stakeholders, and the legal system was weak with lack of enforcement. 
The author recommended that, there should be more focus on the effectiveness of protection 
of minority shareholders and other stakeholders against misused  of corporate asset by block-
holders  and not only on  directors duties. In addition, he affirmed that the allocation of 
important supervisory and judicial powers to administrative agencies such as Colombia 
superintendence of corporation, the Argentine inspection of Justice or the Chilean 
superintendence of securities and insurance will solved the problem. 
 In Uganda, CMA (2006), found that there are  difference effort  that have been made 
by  various organisation like bank of Uganda, the institute of corporate governance of 
Uganda, and the Capital Market Authority (CMA)  to improved the corporate governance 
system. The CMA designed the guideline in a minimum standard for sound corporate 
governance practice by public companies and issuers of corporate debt in Uganda. This 
development in the regulatory frame work of the CMA is very important at this period as a 
result of awareness the importance of governance in both emerging and developing 
economies for improvement of domestic and regional capital market growth.  It was based on 
this, that CMA conducted a survey of compliance level of seven listed companies by using 
the data from annual report of those companies. The organisation found that there are needs 
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for better clarity when providing for corporate information, and there is need for 
improvement in degree of reporting and most companies provide generic information.          
 Furthermore, in the Middle East and North African region Sourial (2007) overviewed 
the governance model of the corporate sector and securities market of eleven countries in the 
region out of eighteen countries. The author revealed   that recently the region has undergone 
some reforms and restructuring on legislative, but the main issue is the gap between 
legislative framework and enforcement. In addition he found that Middle East and North 
Africa (MEND) market corporate sector is fully with block holder (insider) and they depend 
on banks for sources of financing. In the region banking sector are  having burdened with 
non-perform loan (NPLs), resulting from over lending couple with conflict of interest, and 
international fraud and over value of collaterals. Market disciplines with various guideline 
and tools are yet to developed to extent of improving corporate governance practices and 
markets are either inefficient or mainly weakly efficient.  Moreover, the family business in 
the region has a foundation, and is the backbone of the regional countries’ economies, and it 
was like that for long period of time. The author recommended that the tradition and cultures 
should be allowed to choose their acquaintance measure with number of reforms measures 
that will bring better corporate governance practices. The new innovation might bring 
resistance to reforms and it may collapse.  Finally, the author suggested that the banks should 
play their role properly, as the main stakeholders as they are far developed in compared with 
securities market in the region.   
In Nigeria, Ahunwan (2002) provided the account of the system of corporate 
governance in Nigeria and examined the prospect for recent reform and how it will contribute 
to more governance. The author found that the judiciary system is weak, and the economy is 
made of underdeveloped market institution, a high level of information asymmetries, deeply 
rooted with corruption and disregard for rule of law. As a result, the majority of the 
shareholders expropriated the benefit of control without taking the interest of the minority 
shareholders into consideration. However, the author revealed that although the reforms have 
brought some progress, the reform has to address the deeper causes of the problem for 
example an ineffective legal system, ownership structure and capital market. In addition, the 
author claimed that ultimately, the successes of corporate governance reforms are associated 
with broader government reforms of Nigeria state and this will make the country to compete 
in the global economy. 
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  Furthermore, Rossouw, et al (2002) explained that since the publication of the 
Cadbury report that defined corporate governance as the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled. The King’s report in South Africa used this definition as a base in 
formulation of corporate governance system in South Africa. The authors reviewed the 
corporate governance that currently exists in South Africa by looking at both financial and 
ethical dimensions of corporate governance. The authors posited that there are indications 
that corporate governance in South Africa is developing with confusion and the cause of this 
confusion makes the revision of corporate governance an ongoing concern.  For South 
African to participate in the global economy they have to meet the international corporate 
governance standards; however, they have to do this without separating themselves from the 
rest of the African continent. The authors found that confusion with South African corporate 
governance was noticed by the globalization of South Africa companies and their reliance on 
foreign capital flows. The situation in the country is also complicated as a result of 
insufficient statutory and legal backing on the broad corporate governance level for the 
directives that have developed on the narrow corporate governance level. 
The authors suggested that the companies have to solve local challenges such as economic 
empowerment of the black majority in South Africa, how to eliminate the crime such as fraud 
and money laundering, the reality of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and 
how to deal with poverty in the country.   
 Broshko and Li (2006) examined from both theoretical and legal perspectives the 
United State rules-based and Canadian principle-based approach in area of regulation and 
enforcement of corporate governance. The authors found that following the factors allow 
Canada to have a principle-based system: The Canada market consists a far greater 
proportion of companies that managed by the firm’s founders with small firms that lack 
financial resources to obey the US rules. The principle based approach was more effective in 
establishing a culture of compliance corporate governance principles, imposed the way of 
implementing governance standard on the capital market and involvement instead on 
legislators as under the rules-based approach. The empirical study show that Canadian firms 
in comparison to US firms have smaller board with fewer independent director holds meeting 
regularly. In addition, there is less likely to have CEOs also serving as the chairman of the 
board, and fraction of the independent directors sitting on the difference committee was 
significantly lower. The authors maintained that they hesitate to mention the advantages of 
Canadian principle-based system because of the fact that there are changes and innovation in 
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the system, then any system they want to adopted to will depend upon whether Canada will 
experiences its own series of failure in the governance of the companies which will lead to 
the downfall of the economy.     
  At global level Khanna, et al. (2006) used empirical analysis to examine the 
globalization and similarities in corporate governance, with cross-country analysis. The 
authors found that, some scholars argue that globalization should force the firms to maintain 
the most efficient system of corporate governance. The authors posited that economically 
interdependence countries have the nearly the same corporate governance laws protecting the 
stakeholders. However, the authors claimed that virtually no relationship between corporate 
governance practice and globalization in across the countries in term of firm level. The 
authors recommended that globalization may have introduced some common corporate 
standards, and unfortunately these standards have not been implemented.  Pinto (2005) used 
conceptual approach to discuss how globalization has improved the development of corporate 
governance. The author found that the issue of corporate governance of stakeholders and 
ownership model deal with how a particular system develop and the level to which the 
system can influence one another. The process of globalization has bring up the issue of 
whether a certain system was optimal and given the competition there may be some form of 
convergence, the trade globalization has bring up a significant economic and policy issue. 
While the comparative corporate governance studies have influence good economic decision 
and enhance investors’ confidence which will have some effect.   
2.4.6 The power of shareholders  
 Oluyemi (2005) posited that shareholder is presenting a major role in the provision 
of corporate governance. Moreover, the author asserted that small or diffused shareholders exert 
corporate governance by directly voting on critical issues such as mergers, liquidation and some 
fundamental changes in the business strategy. They also indirectly elect the boards of directors 
to represent their interests and oversee the myriad of managerial decisions. The author further 
revealed that incentive contracts are common mechanism for aligning the interest of managers 
with those of shareholders. Then the board of directors may negotiate managerial compensation 
with believe that it will yield a particular results. In addition, the author argue  that large 
ownership is another mechanism will disallowed the managers from deviating too much from 
the interest of the owners.  Large shareholders have incentives to obtain information and 
monitoring managers, and they can also elect their representative to the board of director and 
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check managerial control of the board. They can also be more effective in exercising their 
voting rights than an ownership structure which is dominated by small and uniformed investors. 
Consequently, large shareholders can  be more effective in the negotiation of managerial 
incentive contract that align owner and manager interests than poorly informed small 
shareholders whose representative the board of director can be manipulated by the management. 
However, DeAngelo and DeAnglo (1995) revealed that large ownership brings some corporate 
governance problems, this occur when the large  investors exploit business relation with other 
firm they own which will profit them at the expense of the bank. Moreover, with larger 
shareholders private benefits of control can be maximised at the expense of smaller 
shareholders.      
 OECD (2004) specified the following as the basic shareholder rights this including 
the right to secure method of ownership registration, convey or transfer share, obtained relevant 
and material information on the corporation on a timely and regular basis. Then participate and 
vote in general shareholder meeting, elect and removed members of the board, and share in the 
profit of the corporation. In addition, shareholders should have the right to participate in, and to 
be sufficiently informed on decision concerning fundamental corporation changes, for example 
amendments to status or articles of incorporation, the authorisation of additional share and 
extraordinary transactions, including the transfer of all or substantially all assets that in effect 
result in the sale of the company. Moreover, capital structures and arrangements that enable 
certain shareholders to obtain a degree of control disproportionate to their equity ownership 
should be disclosed, and the exercise of ownership rights by shareholders, including 
institutional investors, should be facilitated. 
 Furthermore, Shleifer and Vishiny (1997) revealed that in more extreme situation 
large shareholders have outright control of the firm and their management with fifty-one or 
more per cent ownership. As a result, they address the agency problem in the sense that they 
have general interest in profit maximization and have enough over the assets of the firm so 
that their interest  are respected. In addition the authors argue that because large shareholders 
control by exercise their voting rights, their power based on the degree of legal protection of 
their votes. Majority ownership only works if the voting mechanism works, and majority 
ownership dictate the decision of the company and in which they need the enforcement by 
courts.  According to the authors, in US large shareholding and especially majority ownership 
are not relatively uncommon, this because of legal restriction on high ownership and exercise 
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of control by banks, mutual funds, insurance companies and institutions. Holderness and 
Sheehan (1988) found that many shareholders have over fifty-one percent in the public firm.  
Black and Coffee (1994) claimed that there is dispersed ownership by diversified 
shareholders in UK. However, Gompers et al. (2003) posited that shareholders rights vary 
across firms by using the indices of twenty-four governance rules and constructing a 
Governance Index to proxy for the level of shareholder right of about 1500 large companies. 
The authors empirically show  that firm with stronger shareholders rights have increase in 
firm value, more profits, higher sales growth, lower capital expenditure, and involvement in 
less corporate acquisition.  
 Moreover, Hart (1995) found that small shareholders have little incentive to 
oversee the management or attached through a proxy fight, the author further explained that 
some authors believed that one method to improved corporate governance was to ensure that 
a company has one or more large shareholders. In the UK it is suggested that the institution 
has an important part to play in this area. The author argue that where a large shareholder 
having less than 100 percent shares of the company, agency problems may be reduced, but it 
cannot be removed.  The large shareholder will underperform in monitoring and intervention 
activities because he did not receive 100 percent of the gains, the large shareholder may use 
his voting power to improve his position at the expense of other shareholders. Then the large 
shareholder may easily become part of management, such as running the company by himself. 
Another problem with the large shareholder is that if the large shareholder is an institution, 
the shareholders of the institution will hire a manager to act on their behalf. This will 
definitely introduce a new principal-agent problem. This clearly shows that managers of the 
institution will do a good job to monitor, as against to pursing his own goal which involves 
the extraction of some private benefit from managers of the company who are meant to 
monitored.  In addition, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) explained that shareholders should focus 
their attention on the financial and strategic performance of the company and they should not 
use the corporate governance system to pursue social and political ends. The authors revealed 
that such activity only increased the tension between shareholders, managers and directors, 
diverting the latter two groups from focusing the way they will improve the performance of 
the company.  
  Payne, et al. (1996) posited that legally, institutions that are acting as fiduciaries 
should take the interest of beneficiaries as important. Also fiduciary agents are banks trustees 
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which are not to consider self interest or interest of the third parties on decision making that 
affect asset value (shareholder voting). Moreover, management may work to established 
themselves firmly at the expense of outsider shareholders and may force the institutional 
investors to vote in support of their proposals. The study provide an empirical analysis 
whether banks voting system is consistent with beneficiary interest. The results shows that 
where directors interlock and income-related relationships occurs, bank tend to vote in favour 
of management anti-takeover proposal. If there are no businesses relationships banks tend to 
vote against the proposal. 
 OECD (2004) revealed that corporate governance should ensure that equitable 
treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders 
should have the opportunity to obtained effective redress for violation of their rights. The 
confidence of minority shareholders is enhanced when the legal system provides mechanism 
for minority shareholders to bring lawsuits when they have a reasonable point to believe that 
their rights have been violated. The provision of such enforcement mechanisms is a main 
responsibility of legislators and regulators.  Furthermore, Shleifer and Vishiny (1997) posited 
that a substantial minority shareholder has the incentive to obtain information and monitor the 
management, thereby avoiding the traditional free rider problem. They have enough voting 
control to put pressure on the management in some situations, or have power to force the 
management out through a proxy fight or takeover. The authors explained that large minority 
shareholders are more complicated since they have to make alliance with other investors in 
order to exercise control. The power of the managers to interfere in this alliance is highly 
enhanced, and the courts have the power to protect their rights. As a result the  large minority 
shareholding may be relevant only in countries with relatively powerful legal systems, while 
in countries with weak legal system are more likely to have outrights majority ownership.  In 
addition, Oluyemi (2005) found that minority shareholders may exert corporate governance 
directly through their voting rights and indirectly by the board of directors electing them, but 
there are some factors that can prevent minority shareholder from effectively exerting 
corporate control. This occurs as a consequence of large information asymmetries between 
managers and minority shareholders, as managers have enormous direction over the flow of 
information. The minority shareholders frequently lack the expertise to monitor managers 
accompanied by each of the shareholder’s small stake which can induce a free rider problem. 
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This indicates that each shareholders relies on others to undertake the costly process of 
monitoring managers, this imply that there is too little to monitoring.        
  Nevertheless, the  agency theory argue that better corporate governance give 
higher stock price and improves long-term performance, this as a result of managers are  
better supervised and agency cost is reduced Gompers, et al. (2003) shows that firms with 
sound corporate governance practice have higher valuations, higher profit, higher sales 
growth, lower capital expenditure. Brown and Caylor (2004) revealed that better governance 
are relatively more profitable, more valuable and pay-out more cash to their shareholder, and 
Gov-Score are more highly  link to with performance. Based on the above evidence, an 
examination of corporate governance variables responsible for improvement in firm 
performance on the basis of the principal agent theory has produced difference results. The 
studies of corporate governance practices in this regard, include board composition, board 
size, and power separation between board chairperson, and CEO. 
 2.4.7 The Board Composition and Size 
 The composition of the board of directors is very important for the board to perform 
their functions without any control from anybody. The board should include individual with 
good personal character and ability to perform the board’s duties, integrity, having sense of 
accountability, record of success, and leadership qualities. In addition, he or she must be 
expert in the field of finance with experience, and must always think strategically. The 
directors must show his committed to the organisation by prepared and present for meeting. 
Most of the empirical studies on effect of board composition on firm performance are given 
difference result, contrary to expectation. Vafeas and Theodorous (1998) examined the 
relationship between board structures with performance in UK by using the data from 250 
publicly traded firms. With the following assumption that; the non-executive board members 
are purported to improve the board’s monitoring quality since they are more likely to be 
independence in mind.  In addition, with director stock ownership thought to grant directors 
shareholder-like interest which motivating director to increase their monitoring performance. 
Then choosing an independent board chairman was purported to improve a board’s 
monitoring quality. Finally, the monitoring value of non-executive should be best 
exemplified in the work of those standing committees which concentrated on decision control 
duties (the audit remuneration, and nomination committees). Expectedly, these board 
monitoring feature are to lead to higher corporate performance. On the contrary, the results 
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revealed an insignificant relationship between the percentage of non-executive directors, 
leadership structure, board ownership and committee composition to the firm performance. 
Based on the above findings from the study, the authors recommended that uniform board 
structures have been advocated by most of the scholars will not basically improve 
performance and markets will determine the monitoring. 
 Wagner, et al. (1998) used two studies to empirically examined the commonly belief 
that corporate board are likely to have positive effects on organisation performance when 
include outside directors. The first study shows that, on average the greater presence of 
outsider is relate with higher performance, but also the greater presence of insiders. Instead of 
the result given the evidence of positive outsider effect, these result suggested the existence 
of a curvilinear homogeneity effect by which performance is relative greater by presence of 
either insider or outsider directors. The second study used hierarchical polynomials 
regression analysis of data from 259 US companies, the result indicate the presence of a 
curvilinear relationship between insider/ outsider composition and Performance measured as 
return on assets.   
 Furthermore, Heracleous (2001) argues that the accepted ‘‘Best Practices’’ on 
corporate governance has generally failed to find convincing link between these practices and 
organisation performance. Using empirical analysis, the result shows that the relationship 
between two best Practices CEO/chair duality and insider and outsider composition and 
organisation performance to be insignificant. He proposes four possibilities and implication 
for each of the possibilities for this relationship that is mutually exclusive.  Firstly, the 
possibility that best practices in corporate governance’s index is not a determinant to 
organisation performance and the implication is that corporate governance best practice needs 
to be seriously reorganised without any doubt. Secondly, that operational performance of 
theoretical concept has low face validity and there is need for higher face validity of 
operation by behavioural observation and interview of the directors. Thirdly, the studies are 
not wide to aiming to show board characteristics to organisational performance and not to 
take note of systemic factor and there is need for research models and paradigms that can 
explain the systemic and multi-directional influences. Lastly, that difference type of 
organisation performance need difference practice in corporate governance and this indicate 
that a contingency idea needs to be incorporated in the study of governance. Bhagat and 
Black (2002) noticed that on the board of directors of American Public companies, 
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independent directors are more numerous, and many financial analysts and institutional 
investors are confident that a monitoring board composed of independence directors is an 
important structure of good corporate governance. The authors used  empirical evidence to 
disprove the believed by  using the first large sample, to determined the degree of board 
independence (Proxied by fraction of the board of independence directors minus the fraction 
of inside directors on a company’s board) correlate with different measures of long-term 
performance of large American firms. The authors found that low-profitability firms 
increased the independence of their board of directors, but there was no evidence that this 
method succeeded, firms with a more independent board did not perform better than other 
firms. The author results support the method of the firm to test the board structure that 
rejecting the conventional monitoring of board. Moreover, Prasanna (2006) investigate 
whether the board independence has any influence in maximizing value. The author revealed 
that the empirical analysis did not produce evidence to show that there was relationship 
between independence board and value maximization. The author suggested that other related 
controlling variables such as shareholding pattern, market presence, and industry growth 
should be include in the study. However, the corporate governance reforms changing from 
non-executive director to independent which shows that over the past five years corporate 
board have change drastically. Currently most of the boards of companies have the highest 
number of non-executive directors. The institutional body in-charge of regulating is 
monitoring seriously to make sure that there are present of non-executive directors on the 
board of company. In addition, Raheja (2005) models the interaction of firm insiders and 
outsiders on a corporate board and discussed the question of board’s ideal size and 
composition. In the model the results shows, that the board duties was for monitoring and 
making CEO succession decision. The insider directors are better informed on the quality of 
the firm investment projects, although outsiders can use CEO succession to encourage 
insiders to show their superior knowledge and assist the board in implementation of higher 
value projects. The optimal board structure was determined by trade off between maximizing 
the ability of outsiders not to accept inferior projects and the optimal board size  and 
composition are function of director’s and the firm’s features. Finally, the author developed 
testable implication for cross-sectional variation in the optimal board structure across firms. 
 Guest (2008) used a comparative analysis of the UK and US legal institution in 
proposing the  hypothesis that UK board  will play a weaker monitoring role and the  board 
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structure will not determined by monitoring  related factors.  With empirical evidence, the 
result revealed that board structure determinants are difference in predicting way across 
various institutional setting, in contract to current US mandatory reforms, and UK reforms 
have been voluntary. The author view support this position, that UK reforms do not have 
significant impact on board structure, although many firms refuse to comply and those that 
that comply do so for economic reason. The reforms demonstrate how to reduce CEOs ability 
of good performance to influence board structures.  
 In a different method in measuring efficiency relating to performance, Tanna, et al. 
(2007)  examined  sample of eighteen banks in United Kingdom and Provided  with  
empirical results on the link  between the efficiency of UK banks and two important aspect of 
Board structures, which are Board size and Board Composition. In this study the authors used 
Data Enveloped Analysis (DEA) to estimate the technical, allocative, and cost Efficiency of 
banks. The authors found that board size was associated to efficiency. Moreover this impact 
was not robust across different samples and specifications. The compositions of the board 
have a positive and significantly impact on all measure of efficiency. The finding provides 
evidence in support to the theoretical argument of Fama and Jensen (1983) also the 
recommendation of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) revealed that non-
executive director can bring valuable knowledge into the bank in other to enhance 
independence and objectivity. 
 In case of the board size, there is clear indication of negative relationship appears to 
occur between board size and firm performance. Yermack (1996) conducted an empirical 
study to show the relationship between board size and firm value in a sample of 452 large US 
firms. The author found an inverse relationship between board size and firm value, that 
largest fraction of lost value occurs as board increases from small to medium size. The 
financial ratio, which are profitability, and operating efficiency decreases as the board size 
increases and provide stronger CEO performance incentives from compensation and risk of 
dismissal. The results robust to different control variables for company size, industry 
membership, and insider stock ownership growth opportunities, and alternate corporate 
governance structure. Tanna, et al. (2008) empirical revealed that board size has a link with 
efficiency. The authors show evidence on the effect of board size and composition on the 
efficiency of UK banks, although the impact was no rousted across various samples and 
specifications. 
46 
 
  Furthermore, Jensen (1993), Lipton and Lorsch (1992) found that  firms with larger 
boards are less performed than  firms with fewer  boards and  are easier  for CEO to control. 
Then firms with larger boards’ size cost of remuneration, sitting allowance, and other 
expenses are higher than firms with fewer board size. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) claimed that 
a smaller board size will make directors to know each other, in other to deliberate on issues 
more effectively with directors making contribution and reaching a true agreement from the 
deliberation. Moreover, Andres, and Vallelado, (2008)  in their presentation of  a paper on 
role of the board of directors in corporate governance in banking with a large sample of 
international commercial banks to test the hypothesis of dual role of directors. The empirical 
study revealed an inverse relationship between bank performance, and board size, and also 
between the proportion of non-executive directors and performance. This indicated that bank 
board composition and size are related to director’s ability to monitor and advice 
management, therefore, larger independent boards might prove more efficient in monitoring 
and rendering more valuable advice. 
2.4.8 Power separation between board chairperson and CEO  
 Several of the studies that examined the separation of board chairperson and CEO 
argue on the basis that agency problem is higher when the same officer holds both positions. 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) examined empirically the relationships among corporate 
governance, performance, corporate capital structure and ownership structure. The result 
shows that CEO-Chairman separation was significantly correlated with operating 
performance. Baliga and Moyer (1996) investigate the relationship between the CEO duality 
and firm performance, it consider the pronouncement effect in duality structure, accounting 
measure of corporate performance. The empirical analysis of data shows that market was 
indifferent to changes in duality status of firms, there was little evidence of operating 
performance changes around duality status, and there is weak evidence that duality status 
affect long-term performance when other factors that can impact the performance have been 
control. Brickley, and Jarrel, et.al (1997) using empirical evidence posit that separating the 
chairman of board and CEO will reduce agency cost in firm and improved performance. Pi 
(1993) examined the variation in performance and the relationship between performance with 
top management team ownership structure, and the composition of the board of directors for 
a sample of US bank holding companies. The performance was measured on Return on Asset, 
and Return on Equity. An efficiency was measured by using an Econometric Frontier 
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Approach (EFA) as cost efficiency as performance. The result shows that on the average, 
banks where the CEO is also the Chairman of the board under-perform those banks where the 
CEO is not Chairman of the board. The author found that the relative different in 
performance was higher for Return on Asset (ROA) than for Cost Efficiency. This indicate 
that Chairman-CEO banks are more output for cost inefficient (ability to control cost) relative 
to non-Chairman-CEO banks.  Secondly, for non-Chairman-CEO banks there was 
significantly positive relationship between performance and CEO ownership.  Thirdly for 
Chairman- CEO Banks the relationship between performance and CEO ownership was 
significantly negative. Finally, the author  suggested that the level of performance for either 
Chairman-CEO or non-Chairman-CEO banks was generally not related to ownership by 
institutions or large block-holders, and the proportion of insiders board members.  
2.4.9 Contemporary state of corporate governance 
  In examination of how global financial crises affect the development of corporate 
governance, Baker (2009) argues that there are factors which are not related to corporate 
governance such as macroeconomic policy and weakness in the global financial infrastructure 
act as major significant role in the financial crises. Although, there other factors that are 
incomplete list of contributing factor but some of this might be the excessive losses, 
monetary policy after 2000, the inadequate regulation of the sub-prime mortgage market in 
the US.  In addition, the unsatisfactory functioning of credit rating agencies and the lack of 
centralised cleaning house for credit derivatives. However, there was little that national 
corporate governance system did seriously to solve the crisis especially with respect to 
financial institutions.  For examples, many banks could not avoid the temptation of 
leveraging their balance sheet to unsustainable level in a variety of complex and opaque ways. 
Then also the temptation to chase competitors in an upward spiral of risk was not avoidable 
and bank boards were not able to effectively manage the risk they were exposed. In addition, 
the author explained that there was failure of internal control, which is a fundamental 
corporate governance responsibility of the board and shareholders. The board and 
shareholders were not effective in restraining the behaviour of the bank in excessive building 
up of leverage, moreover, the author recommended that the recent corporate governance 
reform around the world should not be reversed with view that corporate governance system 
as a whole has failed entirely.  As a result corporate governance should be view as work in 
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progress, and the global financial regulation needs more attention of the regulators and policy 
makers.        
 OECD (2009) analysed the impact of failure and weakness in corporate governance 
on the financial crisis. The paper focused on risk management system, executive salaries, 
accounting standards, and regulatory requirements all are proved to be insufficient in some 
areas. The remuneration systems are certainly not closely related to the strategy and risk 
profile of the companies. The paper recommended that importance of well qualified board 
function and better risk management was not limited to financial institutions. The 
remunerations of the boards and senior management are also a serious controversial issue in 
most OECD countries. The present situation requires the need for OECD to re-assesed the 
adequacy of its corporate governance principles and practice. 
Mallin (2005) reviewed the corporate governance in UK and concluded that the 
adoption of international accepted accounting standard has assisted the UK in having a high 
level of transparency and disclosure in the corporate and financial sectors. This was built on 
the sound foundation of the Cadbury (1992) recommendation, along with the corporate 
governance that evolved through different reports such as Greenbury, Hampel, Turnbull, 
Myners, Higgis and Smith. In July 2003 there was revised Combined Code which was issued 
and has improved the framework for corporate governance. The institutional investors have 
been active in sharing ownership in the company in which they invested into. According to 
the author, in the UK and US institutional investor have become very relevant over the last 
thirty years as their share ownership has increased tremendously and they have become active 
in their ownership role. Furthermore, the author revealed that the UK principles for corporate 
governance are market conform because they stipulate behaviour consistent with incentives 
of management of high quality firms and they do not take the advantages to exploit 
information.  In addition, the author argues that competition in both product and financial 
markets services is important for appropriate market incentives in corporate governance. 
Therefore lack of incentive codes of conduct and legislation will likely bring about 
ineffectiveness in governance. The author suggested that the proposed capital regulation for 
banks in Basel 11 is likely to reduce competition in financial sector. 
Hart (2005) argues that market economy can achieved efficient corporate governance 
by itself, from this statement. The author found that part of policy implication case for 
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statutory rules is weak, and Cadbury approach of enlighten and persuading companies to 
bring innovation into corporate governance is the best. The Cadbury recommendation should 
be seen in the context of corporate governance structure generally. Although, Cadbury 
recommendation is promoted, but it is also important to make sure the existing mechanisms 
operate freely to bring adequate check and balances on managerial behaviour. If there is any 
attempt to weaken this mechanism, this may allow corporate governance to be more rigid, 
and the company performance will be worse in the long term. 
  Moreover, O’Hara and Macey (2003) recommended that a hybrid approach to 
cooperate governance in which most firms are governed with US model, and banks are 
governed according to the Franco-German is idea. The authors believed that Franco-German 
model is likely to be well operated in the US than it has been in European continent because 
US has a developed private enforcement system in which beneficiaries of fiduciary duties can 
sue in the law court in order to vindicate their rights.   In addition, the authors used the 
dominant model of corporate governance in economics and law which posited that 
corporation is a complex set of ‘’explicit and implicit contracts’’. This implies a set of 
contractual arrangement among various claimants to the products and profits generated by the 
companies. The claimants are not only shareholders, but include creditors, employee-
managers, and the local communities in which the business is operating, suppliers, and 
customers. In banking industry the claimants also include the regulators in their duties as 
insurers of deposits and lenders of last resort and been an agents of other claimants. 
Gischer et al. (2007) shows a comparative analysis between corporate governance of 
Anglo-Saxon and Continental European system with the following features: There are no 
separation of the management board and supervisory board in Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance system because it is shareholder and capital market oriented. The interests of 
other stakeholders are not directly pursued in the system. While in case of Continental 
Europe and Japan corporate governance system, the management board and supervisory 
board are separated. The supervisory board include the employee representatives, 
representatives of loan granting banks and  major shareholders, the  management board job  is 
to act on behalf of the company and not on behalf of shareholders and there is balance of 
interest. In addition, in Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system, financing of company 
does not depend on long-term and partial collateral loans, there are flexibility of labour 
market exist for employee with transferable know how and consequently, there are 
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consistency in corporate governance and capital and labour markets. While the corporate 
governance system in Continental European has a feature of protection the corporate interest 
which is to pursue stakeholder value. The sunken costs related to specific investment are 
covered by codetermination and control rights, with long-term human and real capital 
investments. The Continental European has feature of collective bargaining and the principle 
of relation banking. 
The authors, argues further that a shift from the continental European corporate 
governance system, which was not failed for a long term and can be noticed with the 
following features: The European system has certain rigidity due to the necessary linkages, 
and there is a capital market which has become flexible recently.  Internationally, operating 
of major banks prefer the Anglo-Saxon system of corporate governance, but cooperative and 
saving banks believed in regional focus  that agree with long term relationship banking for 
both the small and medium scale enterprise and private customers. As a result, these financial 
institutions are bound to continental European corporate governance system. A change to 
Anglo-Saxon system does not only need all the feature of the system have to be adjusted to 
achieve a consistent system of corporate governance and labour markets.  Then a change in 
the system requires the evidence that the desired corporate governance system will be 
beneficial to overall. 
OECD (2004) revealed that the corporate governance frame work will based on the 
legal, regulatory and institutional environment, and there are other factor such as business 
ethics, corporate awareness of the environment. In addition, societal interest of the area in 
which the firm operates may also have effect on its goodwill and its long-term success. As a 
result, there is no single model of good corporate governance, but the organisation indentified 
some common element as benchmark for good corporate governance. The principle is based 
on this common element and this is  formulated to the different  model that exist for instance 
the issue of board structure and the term they will use as member is not universally agreed. 
The organisation does not lay emphasised on one particular board structure. For example in a 
two tier system we have supervisory board while the key executive is referring to the 
management board. The organisation stated that the difference in area of legislation, 
regulation, self regulation, and voluntary standard will vary from one country to another, and 
the bank regulators are aware of this statement. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2005) noted that there are differences in legislation and regulatory frame work 
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across countries in area of function of the board and senior management. In some countries 
like Germany, China, and Spain there is separation between management and a supervisory 
board. While in US, UK, Australia and other 37 countries there is a sole-board system. In 
France, Finland, Switzerland and Bulgaria operate a mixed board structure, in which the 
firms can decide to operate either sole or supervisory boards. 
2.5   Special feature of banks  
The innovation and development of technologies, the consolidation of banking 
industry, globalisation and the deregulation have made the banking industry face a lot of 
challenges. Consequently, banks are confronted with more competition and a volatile global 
environment than other firms. Against this background, there are significant findings from 
different authors toward the issue of corporate governance in the banking sector. Pati (2005) 
revealed that banks provide financing for commercial enterprises, basic financial services to 
broad segment of the population and access to payments systems, and making liquidity and 
credit available in a difficult market condition.  Furthermore, the author ascertained that the 
banking industry is highly sensitive to public scrutiny and is more vulnerable to the risk of 
attracting adverse publicity through failings in governance and stakeholder relation. The 
banking sector has a special form of corporate governance with its management being guided 
by law or regulatory codes. The author also found that the governance of banks is different 
from other financial sectors base on the complexity of its activities, opacity of books of 
accounts, control of government and the excessive power of regulation of financial 
institutions. This raises question on the issues of transparency, disclosure and agency 
relationship. Moreover, the author claimed that banks have a peculiar problem that is 
different from other corporations which include the following: The activities of banks are not 
open and this makes it difficult for shareholders and creditor to monitor. When the largest 
amount of capital is with the governments the bank activities are opaque, because banks were 
heavily regulated by government. In addition, ownership may be dispersed by mandate, and 
takeover may be hindered through prohibition on bank ownership. The control of bank 
deposits by government can undercut incentives for depositors to monitor management, and 
this will push the responsibility for government banks to other parties or institutions. Finally, 
banks differ from other corporations in terms of their complexity and level of their business 
risks, and the effect if these risks are poorly managed. 
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The banking sector constitutes the largest intermediaries worldwide, as a result of this having 
a sound corporate governance system will surely enhanced their efficiency in their activities, 
and this will increase the economic growth of the country. Therefore, Levine (2002) 
examined three interrelated features of financial intermediaries in which the banking sector 
was involved worldwide and how these characteristics affect corporate governance. Firstly, 
banks have greater opaqueness than other firms, and this increases the agency problem due to 
the greater information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders investors in the banking 
system. Secondly, banks regulators are very strict in their duty of regulation banks and this 
frequently reduces the corporate governance mechanism. The author finally argues that, 
government ownership of banks usually alters the corporate governance structure of banks 
since banks are owned by the state in most countries. This makes the corporate governance of 
the banking sector to be different from other industries.   
Furthermore, Andres and Vallelado (2008) explained that as a result of the importance 
of banks in the economic system and nature of banking business, which make it possible to 
show greater concern about the problem involved in the corporate governance in  the banking 
system, also there are mechanism available to deal with such problems. The authors further 
revealed that the complexity of the banking system increases the level of asymmetry of 
information and reduces the stakeholder capacity to monitor bank manager decisions. The 
banks are the main element in the payment system and play a highly important role in the 
functioning of economic systems, and they have a high level of leverage. Consequently, 
banks face more regulation than other corporations, in which they are responsible for 
safeguarding depositors’ rights, guarantee the stability of the payment system and reduce 
systemic risk. Furthermore, the author explained that regulations of banking bring several 
challenges in the area of corporate governance, which means it can be considered as another 
mechanism of corporate governance. In most cases it reduces the effectiveness of other 
mechanisms in coping with other problems. However, the main aim for the regulator of banks, 
which is to reduce systemic risk, may conflict with the main goal of shareholders which is to 
increase share value. The conflict between the regulator and the shareholders goals introduces 
a new agency problem.  Moreover, Levine (2004) argues that banks are more important for 
industrial expansion, corporate governance of firms and capital allocation. The efficient 
mobilisation and allocation of funds by the banks will lower the cost of capital of firms 
increase capital formation and stimulate productivity growth. As a result, the function of 
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banks has ramifications for the operations of firms and economic prosperity of the nations. 
Having said this, the governance of banks themselves has central roles. Therefore, with the 
issue of banking crises seriously publicised the effect of poor governance of banks.   
In addition, Macey and O’ Hara (2003) found  that the distinction between banks and 
other corporations is that banks are highly geared considering the low proportion of equity in 
their capital structure, and the liabilities are large in  the form of deposits, which are available 
to their creditors and depositors on demand. Their liquidity production function which is 
through the holding of liquid assets and issuing liquidity liabilities as a result, banks create 
liquidity for the economy. Against this background, all the reasons mentioned above make 
banks ‘special’ and financial intermediaries.  The above authors also explained further that 
commercial banks pose a serious corporate governance problem for managers and regulators, 
as well as for claimants on firms’ cash flow such as investors.  According to the authors the 
debate on corporate governance focused on two very different issues: whether corporate 
governance should focus exclusively on protecting the interest of equity claimants in 
corporation, or whether corporate governance should instead expand its focus to deal with 
problem of other group called stakeholders or non-shareholders constituencies.  In this study 
the authors used conceptual evidence, to show that the Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance exclusively focuses to maximize shareholder value, and take the market of 
corporate governance into consideration. On the other hand, the of Franco-German model 
view corporate governance to be an industrial partnership, in which the interest of long-term 
shareholders-mainly banks employee groups, should have the same respect as those of 
shareholders. The authors support the hybrid approach to corporate governance. They 
recommended that bank directors should expand their fiduciary duties beyond shareholders to 
include creditors and to take solvency risk explicitly and systematically into consideration 
when making decisions. In addition, the authors mention that empirical evidence shows that 
countries in which the activities of banks are restricted, probability of having a banking crisis 
is greater even if the regulatory system is a smooth functioning one. 
  Furthermore, Ciananelli and Gonzalez (2000) and Nedelchev (2004) argue that 
corporate governance in banking has three features which are information asymmetry, agency 
theory and the regulation of the state. The authors used this as a premise to examine the 
governance in banks. Nedelchev (2004) used empirical evidence in examining Bulgaria’s 
banking system. The author found that corporate governance in banking in Bulgaria depends 
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on transition period with a low level of shareholder protection. There is a high level of 
information asymmetry, and positive image created by international recognised auditors with 
the strength from current legislation from listed banks. Ciananelli and Gonzalez (2000) 
conceptual analysis, of their finding was consistent with Nedelchev (2004) by revealed that 
commercial banks are distinguished by more complex structures of information asymmetry. 
Caprio jr. and Levine (2002) Levine (2004) and Arun and Tuner (2004) found that 
banks constitute the greatest financial intermediaries globally with the following facing 
corporate governance structure.  There is bad corporate control, with diffused and 
concentrated equity, and debt holder forces. There is also lack of well-trained supervisors, 
and cost of raising capital is a problem.  In addition, there is presence of distributional cartels, 
with bank insiders exploiting the bank for their own purposes. These can bring bank failure 
and thereby reduce the corporate finance and economic development. Using Conceptual 
approach in analysing the problems, the authors found out that these problems are common in 
emerging markets than in developing countries. There is greater opaqueness in banking than 
other industries with greater government regulation, these method weaken many traditional 
governance mechanisms. The authors recommended that where government ownership is 
wide, privatization is essential.  Also where government deposit insurance coverage is 
extremely generous, the reforms should induce creditors with the ability and incentives to 
monitor banks, and there should be foreign entry into the banking system. 
  Nevertheless, Ariff and Hoque (2007) used Australian banks as a case study and 
posited that a superior governance structure accepted that is adhered to fastidiously at each 
bank which will provide the best financial services to their customer within a well-governed 
banking system. In other to achieve this, there is need for an environment that will encourage 
banks to compete for customers in a competitive banking atmosphere. According to the 
authors, from Shleifer  and Vinshy (1997) defined corporate governance as a way in which 
the supplier of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment. The authors explained that in the banking sector the supplier of funds are the 
providers of the tier -1 and tier -2 capitals. When the banks provide the loans, their ability to 
get the loan back from their debtors is very important. This indicate the long –term survival 
of banks depends on earning  an adequate return on investment to the providers of fund, and  
the investors will expect to know whether good corporate governance exist in a bank that is 
performing well. Ariff and Hoque (2007) explained further that the banking sector is 
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tremendously significant in the nation economy and if they have bad management, there will 
be a serious bad effect on the economy as a whole. This is because of their primary role they 
play in terms of intermediation of saving of investment, also in servicing the economic agents 
with efficient payment system mechanism. In addition, the authors posited that failure of the 
banks due to poor corporate governance structures will impact on the economy and will be 
very damaging and destabilising. The authors suggested that the systemic risk from bank 
failure should be avoided because corporate governance of banks is a serious issue which has 
to be taken as a first priority in an economy of nation. In addition, the activities of banks is 
licensed, the set of regulations protecting the banking sector is particularly needed to be 
adhered  to very strictly by banks as it has been supervised by prudential authorities of each 
country in the world.  
Trayler (2007) argue that banking worldwide is a high profile level industry, which 
plays a crucial important role, not only in a country’s economy, but as well the world’s 
economy. This shows that the banking sector has a crucial function of ensuring that the 
stability and integrity of the global financial system.  The failure of the world’s largest banks 
and the fear of the consequence are of great concern for the regulators and governments 
worldwide, and the author believes that banks are different from non-financial companies, as 
a result of their public purpose and the position of trust that they hold in the nation.  For this 
reason, the author examined the corporate governance in 100 top banks in the world by using 
the 13 governance characteristics to determine if there are similarities or differences in their 
corporate characteristics as measured by performance and risk. The author revealed that the 
main key finding  is as follows: banks that have lower percentage of internal directors may 
perform better than banks that have higher percentage of internal directors, and the 
suggestion by board to established audit committees is no longer a differentiator in 
performance.   
  Moreover, Nam (2007) used conceptual analysis to overview the corporate 
governance structure in Korean banks. The author found that the banking sector featured as 
one of the main factors lead to the financial crisis in Korea in 1997, which show that 
government intervention for various reasons was responsible for a weak banking system. The 
wrong structure of corporate governance and the decision making system of Korean banks 
contributed to the fragility of the banking sector. The author recommended that for sound 
corporate governance of the banking industry, the decision making authority should be 
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allocated equitably so that checks and balances are properly operate within the organisation. 
Nevertheless, Andrea (2007) reveals that banks are among the most important sources not 
only for finance, but also for external governance of firms. Then corporate governance of 
banks is an important factor for growth and development. In his argument, the author support 
Ross Levine (2004) point of view and his co-authors from World Bank, which seriously 
query the question of present of a banking regulatory framework? The debate on the 
corporate governance of banks has put forward latest discussions on the future of banking 
regulatory system. The question now is whether the regulatory intervention should be the 
most important corporate control mechanism in banking or should regulators focus on 
introducing incentives for appropriate market behaviour? 
 In addition, Bertus and Yost (2007) used the worldwide studies of banking 
performance and banking stability to show that market attributes are directly related to the 
ability of individual markets to monitor and discipline banks. The authors empirically 
investigate the link of national wealth with bank regulatory policies, as measured by the three 
Pillars of New Basel Capital Accord, which include capital regulatory oversight, supervisory 
oversight and market discipline for different countries. The authors found that countries with 
greater monitoring, as measured by accounting and auditing practices, financial transparency, 
and credit rating efficacy are linked with greater wealth and less risk. In addition the authors 
found no evidence that capital regulatory oversight or supervisory oversight influence a 
nation’s wealth. Moreover, the degree of market information was positively related to the 
level of average GDP, but negatively related to growth rate in GDP.  
 Manthos et.al (2009) examined the relationship between bank-level of productivity 
and the country –level of capital requirement, official supervisory power, market discipline 
and restriction on bank activities in twenty-two countries. In this study, the authors used 
Mamquist index as empirical tools to estimate the total factor productivity growth of banks 
and using robust bootstrap procedure to regress the first stage TFP growth scores on 
regulatory variables. The authors found the following from their study; from the three pillars 
of Basel lI, only market discipline has impact on productivity growth. This suggested that the 
policy makers should make sure there is adequate disclosure of information, and promote a 
framework that gives an incentive for private monitoring.  Moreover, restrictions on bank 
activities had an impact on productivity growth, and the percentage of asset own by foreign 
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banks and credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP influenced positively the total 
factor productivity of banks. 
 Finally, Furfine (2001) argues that banks have been both regulated and supervised so 
that it will not fail and in order to maintain the safety and viability of the financial system. 
Presently, an increase in developments in technology and increase in financial sophistication 
have challenged the ability of traditional regulation and supervision to encourage a safe and 
sound banking system.  The author questions was  whether banks can effectively be 
employed as monitors of their pairs by providing the first empirical examination of the 
pricing of interbank lending agreements. The finding provides enough evidence that banks 
are effective monitors of their peers by showing that interest rate paid on federal funds 
transactions reflect differences in credit risk among the borrowers, especially borrowing 
banks with higher profitability, higher capital ratios and fewer problem loans pay a lower 
interest rate on federal funds loans. The results implied that banks indentify risk in peers and 
effectively monitor other banks. 
2.6 Corporate governance and bank capital structure  
 In relation to ownership structure, most of the research studies on the role and 
function of modern firms were based on the principle of widely dispersed ownership. This 
principle originated from Berle and Means (1932) and has been further developed by Baumol 
(1959), Jesen and Meckling (1976), and Grossman and Hart (1980). A recent study has 
shown that there some concentration of ownership occurred among the largest American 
corporations Demsetz (1983) ,Sheifer and Vishny (1986), Morck et, al. (1988). Higher level  
of ownership occurred in corporations of developed  economies (La porta et, al. (1998, 1999), 
as well as revealing that  ownership and control can be separated to favour the large 
shareholders by finding out who has the highest control rights.  Research studies of other 
developed countries found that more significant concentration of ownership in these countries 
for instances in Germany Edward and Fischer (1994), Frank and Mayer (1994), in Japan 
Prowse (1992), in Italy Barca (1995) and OECD countries European corporation government 
network (1997). In case of developing economies ownership is also concentrated (La porta et, 
al. (1998), Kang and Shivdasani (1995) the study revealed that in several countries large 
corporations have large shareholders and in addition, these shareholders are involved in 
corporate governance mechanism. These studies were against, the Berle and Mean studies 
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that managers are uncountable. Based on the above studies the Berle and Means argument on 
Modern Corporation has become outdated. 
  Caprio et al. (2007) assessed the impact of the ownership structure of banks and 
shareholder protection laws on bank valuation by controlling for various form of regulations 
in bank.  The authors revealed that banks are not widely held, instead family or state control 
banks. In addition, higher cash-flow rights by the controlling owner boost valuation, greater 
cash-flow rights reduced the unfavourable effect of weak shareholders protection laws on 
valuations. These result shows that ownership structure is an essential mechanism for the 
governing of banks. Nevertheless, Cleassens et al. (2000) examined the separation of 
ownership and control for 2980 corporations in nine East Asian countries. The authors 
revealed that in all the countries, control rights exceed cash-flow rights using pyramid 
structure and cross-holding. They proceed further in their study by arguing that separation of 
ownership and control was common among family- controlled firms and small firms. 
Claessens   et al. (2002) carried out empirical study on the difference between the family 
ownership of cash-flow rights and ownership of voting rights in East Asian economies. The 
authors found that the excess of large shareholders’ voting rights over cash-flow rights 
decreases the total value of the firm. Cronqvist and Nilson (2003) reveal that in Sweden, the 
cash-flow ownership does not exceed voting rights that negatively affected the value of the 
firm. In addition, Claessens et al. (2002) examined whether ownership by families, the state, 
widely held firm or widely held financial institutions affected market- to-book ratio. They 
found that concentrated ownership with any types of owners has impact with increased in 
Market-to-book Ratio.  
La porta et al. (1999) revealed that except in economies with good shareholder 
protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held this is in contradiction to Berle and 
Mean view of ownership of the modern corporation. Instead, these firms are controlled by 
families and the controlling shareholders have power over the firms in excess of their cash-
flow rights by the use of pyramid and involved in management activities. Villalonga and 
Amit (2006) argues  that to know whether and when family firms trade at premium or 
discount relative to non-family firms, there should be special attention to the three elements 
in the meaning to family firms; these are ownership, control and management. Does family 
ownership deceased or increased value? Berle and Means (1932) asserted that ownership 
concentration should have positive effect on value because removed the conflict of interest 
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between owners and managers. Demsetz (1983) belief that ownership concentration was 
endogenous output of profit maximization decision by the shareholders and should not affect 
firm value. Demsetz and Len (1985), Himmelberg et al.  (1999) and Demstz and Villalonga 
(2001) revealed the same finding with Demsetz (1983). In addition, Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) assessed the impact of family ownership and management, although they did not 
separate ownership from control.  Above all, none of these studies control for endogeneity of 
ownership and control which was shown as main determinant of their effect on firm value. 
The authors further investigate the relationship between founding-family ownership and 
firms’ performance and found that family firms performed better when family members 
served as CEO than non-family members served as CEO of the firm. This suggested that 
family ownership is an important mechanism in corporate governance structure. 
Moreover, classical corporate finance theories argue that increase in leverage reduces 
managerial agency cost and strengthen corporate governance, because debt is being used by 
investors to generate information to assessed major operating decision. Jesen and Meckling 
(1976), Harris and Ravis (1991) Harvey et.al (2004) revealed that leverage is positively 
correlated with firm value when investment opportunities are scarce and debt reduces the 
problem of overinvestment. In addition, Kaplan (1989) revealed that a higher financial 
leverage associated with leverage buyout have a positive impact on corporate performance. 
Weill (2003) provide empirical evidence on the relationship between leverage and corporate 
performance using Frontier Efficiency Techniques to measure performance of medium-sized 
firms from seven Europeans countries  by finding that a positive impact between leverage and 
corporate performance. Myers (1977) posited that agency cost was as a result of conflicts of 
interest shareholders-debt-holders and suggested that a higher leverage was correlated with a 
lower corporate performance. Nevertheless, Berger and Di Patti (2003) tested the corporate 
governance theory that predicted that leverage affects agency cost and thereby influence firm 
performance, and they revealed that the data on US banking was consistent with the theory. 
Moreover, La bruslerie and Latrous (2007) revealed that the relation between ownership 
structure and leverage varies according to the level of controlling shareholders’ equity 
ownership. When controlling ownership is at low level, debt contrary to equity allows 
controlling shareholders to restrict the dilution of their voting power.  According to the 
authors, this was found that debt in term of leverage was used by controlling shareholders to 
protect themselves from unnecessary takeovers.  
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Furthermore, Driffield, et al. (2007) empirically investigates the effect of ownership 
structure on capital structure with references to the context of over-investment and over-
borrowing within the East Asian corporations during the financial crisis.  The authors 
revealed that the impact of separation of control rights from cash-flow rights on leverage and 
firm value within family managed firms will be different from those that are managed by 
non-family firms. In case of family firms being managed by the owners, higher concentration 
and incentives effect will likely have positive impact on both capital structure and firm value. 
Then entrenchment effects (against minority shareholders) will likely increase leverage but 
decrease the value of the firm. In addition, their study found the inherent simultaneity 
between capital structure and firm value will lead to higher leverage and this will likely 
reduce agency costs of outside equity and increase firm value, and this will motivate 
managers to act more toward the interest of shareholders. 
  The question however remains whether the same corporate governance mechanisms 
that work for non-financial firms also work for banks. Caprio et al. (2007) explained that the 
moment a bank usefully mobilises and distributes funds, this will surely reduce the cost of 
capital to the firms and this will increase capital accumulation and productivity growth. In 
addition, in some countries banks act as major equity holders and creditors and this makes 
them useful in governing corporations. The authors further argue that once bank managers 
encounter sound governance mechanisms banks will raise capital at a lesser cost, allocate 
people’s saving usefully and operate sound governance on the firms they fund. The important 
of bank capital structure cannot be overemphasized against this background. Diamond and 
Rajan (2000) posited that capital structure in a bank is affected by bank safety, the ability of 
banks to refinance at a lower cost and ability to obtain repayment from borrowers or to 
liquidate them.   However, Berger et.al (1995) revealed that banks differ from other firms in 
two important areas that affect their capital structures. These are the availability of regulatory 
safety net that protects the safety and soundness of banks and this certainly reduce the bank 
capital. It also includes the regulatory requirement that increased the amount of capital of 
some banks.   
  In relation to ownership structure in banks, Caprio et al. (2007) found that banks are 
not widely held, instead a family or a state controls banks. Also, higher cash-flow rights by 
the controlling owner boost valuation, greater cash-flow rights reduced the unfavourable 
effect of weak shareholders protection laws on valuations. These results show that ownership 
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structure is an essential mechanism for governing banks. In banking industry, Mehran and 
Thakor (2009) argue that the total value of banks and its equity capital are significantly 
correlated, and the bank’s assets and liabilities, also the net present value (NPV) to 
shareholders, for investment is related to bank capital. From this point of view, those with 
higher control rights will have higher return on their investment. These indicate that those 
banks with sound governance may have a capital structure that will bring good returns. 
Having said this, the objective of this study is to examine how agency problem which 
exist between the manager and shareholders which could be mitigated in family owner 
managed banks affect the bank leverage. The study further investigates how control right of 
the controlling owner that often exceeds cash flow rights affect leverage in a bank with high 
ownership concentration and also give rise to serious agency problem. The empirical enquiry 
into ownership structure in banks by La porta et al. (1999) did not research in detail on the 
ownership structure of banks in each country and they did not focus on many commercial 
banks, and also Barth et al. (2001 and 2004) empirically revealed the degree of state 
ownership of banking sector in a cross country analysis but they did not give full detail on the 
ownership structure of banks. Mehran and Thakor (2009) examine the link between bank 
capital and bank valuation. We are however not aware of any research exploring the possible 
role of corporate governance of banks on bank’s capital management. Using cross-country 
bank-level data, this present study aims to bridge this gap in the literature. The analysis of 
bank leverage is very important because there is a need to understand the relationship 
between leverage decisions and the ownership structures of banks which have been 
emphasised in the wake of the current financial crisis that shows the risk of lending booms 
which result in the downturns of the global economy. Consequently, this study focus on the 
following hypotheses:  Firstly, bank leverage is likely to be lower in family- owner managed 
firms. Secondly, 
      
bank leverage is likely to be higher if control exceeds cash flow rights. 
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     CHAPTER THREE 
     METHODOLOGY   
3.1 Introduction 
 Caprio et al. (2007) provides two questions on ownership. Firstly, are banks widely 
held or do they have controlling ownership with significant control and cash flow rights. 
Against this background, this study model Caprio et al. (2007) and  advance the course of 
study of governance and bank capital structure by considering leverage as dependent variable 
and include  family or individual owner and Control exceed cash flow rights  has independent 
variables. A database from Caprio et al (2007) is used covering 244 banks across 44 countries 
to assess the impact of the family owner managed firms and control exceeds cash-flow rights 
on leverage In addition, Caprio et al. (2007) explained that owner’s voting rights will exceed 
the owner’s cash-flow rights when the owner controls votes through difference affiliated 
parties without having the rights to all cash-flow received by those affiliated parties.  
 
3.2 A model of Bank leverage 
 On the basis of the existing literature, we focus on the following hypotheses:   
(i)  
(ii)
Bank leverage is likely to be lower in owner managed family firms. 
 
Thus for the  i-th bank, bank leverage can be determined as follows:  
Bank leverage is likely to be higher if control exceeds cash flow rights 
Lit = β0 + β1 family-ownership+ β2 CEC+ β3 Xi
Where leverage is measured by the liability ratio (total liability as a share of total assets). 
Other control variables X
 + ui 
 
Finally, ui is the random error term, which is independently and identically distributed.  
 includes bank size (proxied by bank assets), profitability and also 
geographical regional dummies indicating if the bank is located in Asia, Africa, Latin 
America (the reference category being OECD countries).  
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3.3 Data and Variables. 
3.3.1 Data Sources. 
 The data for study come from Caprio et al (2007) a new data based covering 244 
banks across 44 countries. The study indentified that (1) non-financial institutions own banks 
shares, (2) BANKSCOPE and the BANKERS ALMANAC have only information on 
financial institutions, (3) Bank ownership was traced through corporations back to individuals. 
The WORLDSCOPE have ownership data of firms, as a result, the study used 
WORLDSCOPE in addition with 20-F filings, company reports, and filings from National 
Stock Exchanges and Securities Regulations to know the ultimate owners of corporations that 
own share in banks. The ownership data are from year 2001, but there are some instance of  
using 2000 data this result that  ownership pattern are very stable this will not bring any 
problems and bias to the result of the study. 
 3.3.2 Sample. 
 The study uses Caprio et al. (2007) database that is made up of sample consisting 244 
banks across 44 countries and focuses on the largest banks which depicts the level of 
comparisons across the countries. In addition, the largest banks tend to have the most liquid 
shares, make it to be less concern that liquidity differences drive the results. 
 
3.4 Control rights. 
 From the earlier study of Caprio et al. (2007), the data on control rights of banks 
which was build up from La port et al (1999, 2002) method for assessing the ownership 
structure of firms. The major shareholders are from financial or non-financial corporation. 
When a shareholder has x per cent indirect control over bank A , if she control directly firm B 
that is  if she hold at least 10 per cent of voting rights of firm B, invariably she have direct 
control x per cent of the vote of bank A.  In another situation, a shareholder have x per cent 
indirect control over bank A, if she controls directly firm C that invariably controls directly 
firm B, which directly controls x per cent of the votes of bank A. The author further 
explained that the control chain from bank A to firm C can be  with a long sequence of firms, 
in which each have control greater than 10 per cent voting rights above the next one. In case 
there are many chains of ownership between a shareholder and the bank, then there will be 
sum up of control rights across all of these chains. The authors later indentify the multiple 
shareholders that have above 10 per cent of the votes. Then later pick the largest controlling 
owner, and this analysis was carried out while including an indicator in case if a bank have 
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multiple controlling owners. However, this did not change the result of the study. From this 
process banks are divided into these categories which are; widely held banks which do not 
have a controlling owner that is no shareholder owns 10 per cent or more of the voting rights. 
Then finally created controlling owner with minimum of 10 per cent of voting rights of the 
banks to form:   a) a family or individual owner, b) a widely held financial institutions, and c) 
a widely held non financial institutions. 
 The following variables are associated with control and explained as follows, which is also 
described in Table that shows the summary of the descriptive statistics.  
WIDELY: This is a dummy variable which is equal to one, if there is no legal entity owns 10 
per cent or more of the voting rights, and otherwise zero.  
CONTROL: This is equal to the fraction of the bank’s voting rights, if any owned by its 
controlling shareholder. 
FAMILY: This is a dummy variable equal to one, if an individual or family is the controlling 
shareholder, and zero otherwise. 
 
3.5 Cash flow rights.  
 Cash flow rights are the amount invested in the equity share capital of the firm.  
Caprio et al. (2007) data shows that the direct and indirect cash flow right of the controlling 
(CF) are calculated as follows; The direct and indirect cash flow right can obtained by 
shareholder, for example if the controlling shareholder of bank A holds the fraction y of cash 
flow in firm B then firm B invariably holds the fraction x of the cash flow rights in bank A. 
Therefore, the indirect cash flow rights in bank A of the controlling shareholder are equal to 
the product of x and y. Assuming, there is a long chain of controlling ownership, therefore 
the products of the   cash flow rights along the long chain will be  used. In addition, CF is 
equal to the fraction of the bank’s cash flow rights owned directly and indirectly by its 
shareholder.  
3.6 Measurement of research variables 
 For the purpose of this study, the paper considers corporate governance as an 
independent variable which is proxie in the study by family –owner managed firm, and 
control exceeds cash-flow rights, and dependent variable as leverage.  This used to find out 
how family or individual owner, control exceed cash flow rights is significantly associated 
with leverage.  For a balance econometric definition of the model, the study equally considers 
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inclusion of both control and dummy variables which include profitability ratio, bank size, 
and Asia, Africa and Latin American countries.  
 3.6.1 Control Exceeds Cash-flow rights (CEC)    
   Claessens et al. (2002) have shown that the separation of control and cash flow 
rights of the controlling owner has important implications for corporate governance. The 
particular interesting case is when control rights exceed cash flow rights because it may give 
rise to some agency costs. Higher voting rights are often associated with pyramid ownership 
structures and crossholding. Such situations are associated with an over-reliance on debt due 
to large shareholders being unwilling to dilute their ownership by raising equity finance, 
generally known as non-dilution of entrenchment. 
Caprio et al. (2007) data provides information on controlling owner’s cash flow and 
control rights.  The paper classifies a bank as having controlling owner if the shareholder has 
direct and indirect voting rights that sum up to 10 per cent or more (measured by the variable 
control10). Assuming no shareholder holds 10 per cent of voting rights, the study classify the 
bank as widely held. Conventionally 10 per cent voting rights are adequate to exert control; 
this cut-off is used in the literature (e.g., see La porta et,al. 1999, 2002). Similarly, cash flow 
rights refer to direct and indirect cash flow rights of the controlling shareholder (CF), which 
equals the fraction of the bank’s cash flow rights, at 10 per cent (measured by the variable 
CF10). Using these two variables, we generate a variable control exceeds cash flow (CEC) as 
follows: CEC=Control10-CF10.  
3.6.2 Family. 
 Family is defined as a group of people in relationship through by blood or marriage 
according to this study. The computation of family was based on Caprio et al. (2007) with 
following assumption that family is equal to 1 if an individual or family is the controlling 
shareholder and zero otherwise. This computation was done for each of the banks across the 
countries in the regions. 
3.6.3 Size.  
  This is the logarithm of the bank’s total asset, this bank total asset is in million of US 
dollars, the sources of the data is from Bankscope.  In this study the size is used as one of the 
control variable in measurement of leverage, and this indicates the business structure of each 
of the bank in each country in the region.  
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3.6.4 Performance ratio 
Profitability ratio and Return on asset (ROA) 
 Pandey (2005) Profitability ratio is calculated so as to know the operating efficiency 
of the banks. Apart from management of bank, creditors and owners are interested in the 
profitability of the company. The creditors need their interest and the repayment of principal 
regularly, and the shareholders need a required rate of return on their investment. All these 
are possible only when the company earn enough profits. In this study, the profitability ratio 
was measured by profit over total assets. This was used as a controlling variable in order to 
determine the association between the governance and bank capital structure in term of 
leverage. The return on asset (ROA) is calculated as pre-tax profit over total assets which is 
used as performance ratio   
3.6.5 Capital structure. 
 Pandey (2005) defined Capital structure of a corporation as the proportionate 
relationship between debt and equity. The equity includes paid up capital, share premium and 
reserves and surplus (retained earnings). In addition the author explained that the company 
assets can be financed either by increasing the owner’s claims or the creditors’ claim. The 
owners’  claims is high immediately the firm raises fund by means of issuing ordinary shares, 
or through retaining the earnings, and also the creditors’ claims shut up  by borrowing . 
Therefore these various ways of financing representing financial structure of firm, 
traditionally, short-time borrowing are not part of methods of financing the firm capital 
expenditure, hence the long-term claims form the capital structure of the firm. From the 
above point of view capital structure decision is an important aspect of managerial decision. 
In this study the dependent variables is the capital structure in term of leverage which was 
calculated as follows; Liability Ratio which is the total liability over the total assets and 
equity ratio is equity over total assets. The figure used in this calculation is obtained from 
BANKSCOPE Caprio et al (2007). 
 3.6.6 Dummy variable. 
 The study classifies banks in each country into regions e.g. Asian, Africa, Latin 
America, and OECD, and this was arranged alphabetically.  Each of the columns 
corresponding to every bank in the classification is done according to the region, with Asia, 
Africa, Latin America and OECD equal to  1 or  otherwise zero. In addition, Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America banks are  used as  the dummy variable relative to the banks in OECD 
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countries, which serves  as a base. The reason is to control for possible differences in 
leverage across the banks in the countries in each of the three regions.  
  
3.7 Descriptive statistics of bank ownership around the world.  
Table 1 summarises the quartile distribution of these three variables, namely, 
control10, CF10 and CEC. It follows from our sample distribution that CEC takes a value 0 
for about 78.7% banks in our cross-country sample. Given this skewed distribution of the 
variable, first three quartiles for CEC10 turn out to be zero while the maximum value of 
CEC10 is as high as 94. We include this variable CEC10 to capture the implication of 
underlying agency problem of this type of ownership structure for bank leverage and 
performance.  
Table 2 provides summary statistics for all the countries in the samples. While Table 3 
provides statistical summary base on each region, what extent to which banks are widely held, 
and also show the controlling owner if the banks are not widely held. The result indicates that 
about 48.1 per cent of the samples are widely held in the OECD region, which is the highest, 
follow by 13.6 per cent for the Latin America region, 9 per cent in Asia region, while 7.7 per 
cent in Africa. This indicates that Africa has the least widely held banks. Table 2 also 
provides the summary statistics of the family or individual owners. The result indicates 64 
per cent in the Latin America, which is the highest percentage, followed by 47 per cent in 
Asia, 38 per cent in Africa and OECD with 21 per cent.   
Table 3 also indicates the summary of the statistics on divergent between control rights and 
cash flow rights (control exceeds cash flow rights (CEC10a)). There is a variation in the 
average percentage of control exceeds cash flow rights across the region of the sample of 244 
banks. Latin America has the highest with 63.6 per cent, with 38.5 per cent in Africa, 16.7 
per cent in Asia,   while OECD has the least with 15.3 per cent.  
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Table 1 Showing the distribution of  Control Exceeds Cash Flow (CEC) 
QUARTILE Control 10  
(Percentiles) 
CF10 
(Percentiles) 
CEC10 
(Percentiles) 
Minimum 
Q1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Q2 
 
26 
 
18 
 
0 
 
Q3 
Maximum 
 
56.750 
100 
 
43.750 
100 
 
0 
94 
 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of descriptive statistics for the overall sample  
Variables Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum N 
Liabilityratio 0.924 0.040 0.720 0.980 244 
Equityratio 
Pftta  
0.076 
0.009 
0.040 
0.016 
0.020 
-0.150 
0.280 
0.060 
244 
244 
Widely held 0.303 0.461 0.000 1.000 244 
Family1 0.340 0.476 000 1.000 244 
Cec 10a 0.213 0.410 0.000 1.000 244 
Size 16.404 1.991 11.160 20.770 244 
      
Note: This table shows the report of the summary statistics for the variables. Liability ratio 
which is the Leverage is calculated as total liabilities over total assets of the bank and equity 
ratio is calculated as l equity over total assets of the bank.   Pftta is indicated as Profitability 
ratio which is calculated as profit over total assets of the bank, Widely held is a dummy 
variable which is equals one if there is no controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise, Family 
1 is a dummy variable which is equal to one if an individual or family is the controlling 
shareholder, and zero otherwise, Cec10a indicated as when control exceeds cash flow at 10 
per cent in the bank, Size is the logarithm of bank’s total assets.   
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Table 3.  Summary of Descriptive Statistics Based on Region. 
Region Variable Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum N 
Latin 
America 
Pftta 0.018 0.015 0.000 0.060 22 
Cec10a 0.636 0.492 0.000 1.000 22 
Family1 0.640 0.492 0000 1.000 22 
Widely held 0.136 0.351 000 1.000 22 
Size 15.498 1.389 12.25 18.080 22 
 Liabilityratio 
Equity ratio 
0.900 
0.100 
0.037 
0.371 
0.800 
0.050 
0.950 
0.200 
22 
22 
Asia Pftta 0.009 0.009 -0.020 0.030 78 
Cec10a 0.167 0.375 0.000 1.000 78 
Family1 0.470 0.503 000 1.000 78 
Widely held 0.090 0.288 0.000 1.000 78 
Size 15.532 1.447 12.550 18.08 78 
 Liabilityratio 
Equityratio 
0.913 
0.086 
0.045 
0.046 
0.760 
0.030 
0.970 
0.240 
78 
78 
Africa Pftta 0.017 0.012 0.000 0.040 13 
Cec10a 0.385 0.506 0.000 1.000 13 
Family1 0.380 0.506 000 1.000 13 
Widely held 0.077 0.277 0.000 1.000 13 
Size 14.411 2.033 11.160 17.300 13 
 Liabilityratio 
Equityratio 
0.883 
0.119 
0.071 
0.071 
0.720 
0.060 
0.940 
0.280 
13 
13 
OECD Pftta 0.007 0.019 -0.150 0.060 131 
Cec10a 0.153 0.361 0.000 1.000 131 
Family1 0.210 0.412 000 1.000 131 
Widely held 0.481 0.502 0.000 1.000 131 
Size 17.274 1.930 13.650 20.770 131 
 Liabilityratio 
Equityratio 
0.939 
0.061 
0.023 
0.023 
0.840 
0.020 
0.980 
0.160 
131 
131 
      244 
Note: This table reports the summary statistics for the variable for the study. Pftta is  the  Profitability 
ratio, which is calculated as profit over total assets of the bank, Cec10a is the control exceeds cash 
flow rights at 10 per cent in the bank, Family 1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a family or 
individual is the controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise. Widely held is a dummy variable that 
equal to one if there is no controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise, Size is the logarithm of the 
bank’s total assets, Liability ratio which is the Leverage is calculated as the total liabilities over total 
assets of the bank, Equity ratio also know as leverage is calculated as the equity over total assets of 
the bank. 
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Figure 1: 
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Figure 2:  Chart Showing the nuber of banks in Non-OECD countries 
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Figure 3:  Chart showing the number of banks in OECD countries 
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Figure 4:  Chart showing the nuber of bank in Asia countries 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Results of the Data Analysis 
4.1 Regression results  
 In this section this paper present OLS estimates of the empirical model using 
two alternative indices of bank capital structure, namely, liability ratio and equity ratio. 
Following our central hypotheses the study includes family ownership and control exceeds 
cash (CEC) flow as the two key explanatory variables. Other control variables include bank 
size, profitability ratio and geographical dummies indicating if the bank is located in Asia, 
Africa Latin America (the reference category being OECD countries); these regional 
dummies control for variation in bank capital structure across the regions.  For each 
dependent variable, the study uses two specifications. Specification (1) does not include 
family ownership and control exceeds cash flow rights which are included in specification (2). 
Thus specification (2) is a more complete model of our interest and we couch our discussion 
in terms of specification (2). These estimates are summarized in Table 3 below. 
TABLE 3. OLS Estimates of bank capital structure.  
 Liability ratio Equity ratio  Liability ratio ( outlier-
free) 
Equity ratio (outliers 
free) 
 Specification 
1 
Specification 2 Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
    
Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 
Column 1 
 Model 1 
Column 2 
Model 2 
 Column 3 
 
Model 2 
Column 4 
Model 1 
Column 5 
 Model 1 
Column 6 
Model 2 
 Column 7 
Model 2 
Column 8 
 
Intercept 
0.816** 
0.026 
(31.713) 
0.830** 
0.024 
(34.012) 
0.183** 
0.025 
(7.317) 
0.169** 
0.024 
(7.135) 
0.823** 
0.026 
(31.804) 
0.835** 
0.025 
(33.500) 
0.176** 
0.026 
(6.629) 
0.165** 
0.026 
(6.441) 
 
Size 
 
0.007** 
0.001 
(5.016) 
0.007** 
0.001 
(4.773) 
-0.007** 
0.001 
(-5.173) 
-0.007** 
0.001 
(-4.927) 
0.007** 
0.001 
(4.674) 
0.006** 
0.001 
(4.490) 
-0.007** 
0.002 
(-4.504) 
-0.006** 
0.001 
(-4.322) 
 
Profitability 
-0.587* 
0.299 
(-1.96) 
-0.613* 
0.270 
(-2.268) 
0.595* 
0.295 
(2.017) 
0.621* 
0.265 
(2.344) 
 
-0.528* 
0.281 
(-1.876) 
-0.547* 
0.251 
(-2.180) 
0.518* 
0.285 
(1.817) 
0.536* 
0.255 
(2.104) 
 
Family is the 
controlling 
owner 
 
- 
-0.019** 
0.005 
(-3.473) 
 
- 
0.019** 
0.005 
(3.591) 
- -0.018** 
0.005 
(-3.305) 
 
- 0.018** 
0.005 
(3.203) 
 
Control 
exceeds cash 
flow at 10% 
- 0.011* 
0.006 
(1.730) 
- -0.011* 
0.006 
(-1.771) 
- 
 
0.008 
0.001 
(4.490) 
- -0.007 
0.006 
(-1.188) 
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Asia 
  
-0.013* 
0.006 
(-2.291) 
-0.010* 
0.005 
(-1.891) 
0.014* 
0.005 
(2.553) 
0.011* 
0.005 
(2.160) 
-0.017** 
0.006 
(-2.970) 
-0.013* 
0.005 
(-2.520) 
0.015** 
0.006 
(2.684) 
0.012* 
0.005 
(2.222) 
 
Africa -0.023* 
0.010 
(-2.280) 
-0.023* 
0.011 
(-2.075) 
0.022* 
0.010 
(2.321) 
0.022* 
0.011 
(2.103) 
-0.025* 
0.010 
(-2.449) 
-0.023* 
0.011 
(-2.062) 
0.025* 
0.010 
(2.413) 
0.023* 
0.011 
(2.036) 
Latin 
America 
-0.026** 
0.009 
(-3.047) 
-0.025** 
0.009 
(-2.889) 
0.026** 
0.009 
(3.046) 
0.025** 
0.009 
(2.912) 
-0.020** 
0.008 
(-2.601) 
-0.018* 
0.007 
(-2.428) 
0.020** 
0.008 
(2.617) 
0.018* 
0.007 
(2.429) 
R 0.34 2 0.38 0.35 0.40 0.33 0.37 0.32 0.35 
F-statistic 24.60 20.68 26.15 22.10 22.12 18.44 20.54 17.08 
No of 
observation 
244 244 244 244 228 228 228 228 
Number of 
countries  
   44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
 
Dependent variable is leverage which are liability and equity ratios. Size of the bank is Log(total assets) and  Profitability ratio is 
profit over total assets are control variables. Family is the controlling owner is a dummy variable equal one if a family is the 
controlling shareholder and zero otherwise. Control exceeds cash flow (CEC) at 10% is equal to 1 if CEC at 10% is greater or 
equal to 2 and zero otherwise. Geographical regional dummies indicating if the bank is located in Asia, Africa and Latin America 
(reference category being OECD countries).  Column (5)-(8) indicate the test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of 
the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and Numbers in the 
parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
**significant at 1 per cent level. 
*significant at 5 per cent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
 
Table 3 shows the OLS estimates of the two key governance variables, namely, 
family-ownership and control exceeds cash flow rights. It follows from column 2 of Table 3 
that the estimated coefficient of family ownership is -0.019, suggesting that bank leverage is 
significantly lower in banks which are family owned. This in turn highlights that family 
owned firms tend to be more risk averse than others, even at the highest level of 
concentration, which in turn may generate a negative relationship between family ownership 
and bank leverage. This result is consistent with Daly and Dollinger (1992) who found that 
family owner managed firms are more risk-averse at highest level of concentration. Also the 
results is  consistent with Anderson et al. (2002) who  suggested that the consequence of 
family managed firms for a long term is that the firm will enjoy a lower cost of debt financing 
compared to other non-family managed-owner  firms. More interestingly, the estimated 
coefficient of Control exceeds cash flow rights (CEC) is 0.011, which is statistically 
significant too. This implies that control exceeds cash flow has a positive effect on liability 
ratio. Consequently, higher control rights (in relation to cash flow rights) may give rise to 
serious agency problem and therefore an over- reliance on debt due to controlling 
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shareholders being unwilling to dilute their ownership. Our finding is consistent with prior 
study by Driffield et.al (2007). In addition, this also suggests that  the control rights of the 
controlling  owner exceeds cash flow rights there  will be fear of sharing of control and being 
interfered by others and this often delays the decision of company to go for public offer. 
Consequently most companies will prefer to raise debt capital (Pandey 1999).  
 Column 2 of Table 3 shows the estimates of equity ratio as an alternative indicator of 
bank leverage. These results are generally in line with the results obtained from using liability 
ratio as a measure of leverage. In particular, we find a positive significant effect of family 
ownership on equity (estimated coefficient of 0.019), thus revealing preference for equity 
financing. This further strengthens the position of our result in model 1.where the inverse 
relationship between leverage and family owner managed firm is interpreted as dependence 
on equity rather on liability. This result is consistent with James (1999) who revealed that in a 
family- managed firms which made up of higher equity, there is possibility of holding long 
on investment and this will result in higher investment efficiency. In addition, the coefficient 
of control exceeds cash flow rights has a significant negative relationship on leverage but not 
so strong. This suggests that firms where control rights of the controlling owners exceed cash 
flow rights, the equity is lower, they prefer liability  financing because of fear of losing 
control, , generally known as non-dilution of entrenchment Claessens et.al (2002)( 
 Among other results, there is evidence that the size of bank has a positive and 
significant effect on debt with coefficient of 0.007. This indicates that larger banks tend to 
have significantly higher leverage. The latter can be facilitated by greater transparency of 
larger bank activities. This finding is consistent with the Rajan and Zingales, (1995) and 
Friend and Lang (1988) that revealed that size of firms are positively related to leverage. 
Similarly bank size has a negative and significant effect on equity ratio. Moreover, 
profitability ratio has a negative significant effect on bank leverage and this estimated 
coefficient of -0.613. This result is consistent with Friend and Lang. (1988) who revealed 
there is negative relationship between profitability and leverage in term of debt. Thus more 
profitable banks have lower loan, but higher equity as there the more profitable banks find it 
easier to raise finance from markets.  There is also significant regional variation in this 
respect. All three regional dummies for Asia, Africa, and Latin America have negative and 
significant coefficients, suggesting that banks in each of these regions has a significantly 
lower debt relative to their counterparts in the more developed world. However, in Table 3 
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column 4 using equity ratio as an alternative indicator of bank leverage, these dummies 
variables have a positive significant effect. This suggests that banks in each of this region rely 
more on equity (rather than debt) finance. 
 Moreover, outlier test is used to examine robustness results and it shows that control 
exceeds cash flow have insignificant effect on leverage. Thus before testing for the outlier of 
the sample, there is a weak significant effect which indicates that when controlling owner 
rights exceeds cash flow rights it might not have strong effect on equity and liability. In 
addition, all others variables have the same effect as when the outliers which are observation 
which are numerically distant from the rest of the data have not being removed.   
 
 
 Table 3a:  Showing  diagnostic test for table 3 
Test Liability 
ratio 
 Equity 
ratio 
Liability ratio Free 
outlier 
Equity ratio Free 
outlier 
JB test 
(normality) 
108.15 109.24 3.28 115.86  
JB test p value 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00  
Ramsey’s RESET 
test 
51.70(0.00) 51.23(0.00)  22.27(0.00)  48.41(0.00) 
Numbers in the parentheses refer to P-Value. 
The result of Jarque-Bera test (JB) from the above table show that for both liability 
ratio and equity ratio the p-value is significant, this indicates that the series are not following 
a normal distribution. This suggests that the data is non-normality. However, when the 
sample is free outlier the p-value of liability ratio indicates insignificant, this confirmed with 
normality of the data. 
The Ramsey RESET test indicates shows that there are no misspecifications this 
because coefficients of the variable are not equal to zero. This suggest that the model is 
correctly specified, no omitted variables and there is correlation between explanatory variable 
(Independent variable) and error.   
4.2 OLS Estimate of Bank Capital structure and Performance  
Weill (2003) revealed that there is a relationship between leverage and performance 
of firms and Myers (1977) suggested that a higher leverage is correlated with a lower 
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corporate performance. As a result, in this section the paper started with two indicators of 
capital structure namely the liability ratio and equity ratio also the indicator of performance is 
Return on assets (ROA). The observation in this study can be summarised as following: 
Variable 
Table 4.  OLS Estimate of Bank Capital Structure and Performance in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America Countries relative to OECD Countries 
 Liability 
(1) 
ROA 
(2) 
Equity  
(3) 
ROA 
(4) 
 
Intercept  
0.853** 
0.032 
(26.331) 
0.106** 
0.017 
(6.068) 
0.138** 
0.222 
(6.249) 
-0.001 
0.006 
(-0.205) 
 
Size 
0.006** 
0.002 
(3.480) 
-0.000 
0.000 
(-0.370) 
-0.005** 
0.001 
(-4.104) 
0.000 
0.000 
(0.312) 
ROA  -1.652** 
0.299 
(-5.522) 
- 1.144** 
0.228 
(5.022) 
- 
 
Liability 
 
 -0.099** 
0.017 
(-5.828) 
- - 
Equity 
 
 - - 0.161** 
0.028 
(5.662) 
 
Family is the 
controlling 
owner 
-0.001 
0.008 
(-0.175) 
0.004* 
0.002 
(2.103) 
0.011* 
0.005 
(2.064) 
0.002 
0.002 
(1.161) 
Control exceeds 
cash flow rights 
at 10% 
0.013* 
0.008 
(1.669) 
0.005* 
0.002 
(1.943) 
-0.009 
0.006 
(-1.575) 
0.005* 
0.002 
(2.011) 
 
Asia 
-0.030** 
0.009 
(-3.375) 
 
-0.010** 
0.003 
(1.943) 
 
0.024** 
0.006 
(4.322) 
 
-0.011** 
0.003 
(-4.411) 
 
Africa 
-0.041** 
0.010 
(-3.928) 
-0.004 
0.003 
(-1.160) 
0.028** 
0.010 
(2.704) 
-0.004 
0.003 
(-1.315) 
 
Latin America 
-0.036** 
0.012 
(-3.091) 
-0.007* 
0.004 
(1.741) 
0.025** 
0.008 
(3.242) 
-0.007* 
0.004 
(-1.854) 
R 0.33 2 0.28 0.43 0.30 
F-statistic 15.68 12.27 24.09 13.33 
No of 
observation 
228 228 228 228 
No of 
countries 
44 44 44 44 
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The study used OLS Estimation with leverage in term of liability and equity ratios as dependent variables and Performance 
indicator return on asset (ROA).  Size of bank is the Log(total assets) which served as a   control variables. Family is the 
controlling owner is a dummy variable equal one if a family is the controlling shareholder and zero otherwise. Control exceeds 
cash flow (CEC) at 10% is equal to 1 if CEC at 10% is greater or equal to 2 and zero otherwise. Geographical regional dummies 
indicating if the bank is located in Asia, Africa and Latin America (reference category being OECD countries). 
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and Numbers in the 
parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
**significant at 1 per cent level. 
*significant at 5 per cent level. 
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
 
Table 4 columns 1 and 4 indicate liability ratio and equity ratio as bank leverage show 
that a family-owner managed firm has no significant relationship with debt but with equity 
ratio. This suggests that Family owner managed firm rely more on equity financing.  While 
control exceeds cash flow rights have a positive effect on liability ratio and with insignificant 
relationship with equity. This implies that when controlling owner control rights exceeds cash 
flow rights they depend more on liability rather on equity because of fear of losing control. 
Moreover, return on asset (ROA) has a negative effect with liability ratio and a positive effect 
with equity ratio. This show that when firm rely on liability the return on asset (ROA) may be 
lower and when they rely more on equity the return on asset (ROA) may be higher   
   In Table 4 column 2 and 4 examined how family owner managed firm and control 
exceeds cash flow influence performance. There is indication that family owner managed and 
control exceed cash flow rights have a positive effect on return on asset (ROA). This suggests 
that ownership structure can influence the performance of bank.  
In case of the Regional effect like Asia, Africa and Latin America on bank leverage 
the result is the same as indicated in Table 3.  However, Asia, Africa and Latin America have 
a negative effect on return on asset (ROA). This may due to lower activities in financial 
intermediation of the region. 
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4.3 OLS Estimation of Bank Capital structure and Performance in OECD and Non-
OECD Countries. 
 Ownership concentration is prevalent both in OECD countries and Non-OECD 
countries, but among the OECD countries except US and UK where ownership concentration 
is not prevalent the reason is that the changing pattern of share ownership lead to a greater 
concentration of ownership in the hand of institutional investors such as pension fund and 
insurance companies. This indicates that in UK and US most of the firms are relatively 
widely held. In Germany and Japan equity ownership are more concentrated where bank play 
a significant roles in governance. This suggests that within the OECD countries there is 
market centred economies which are US and UK and also bank centred economies which are 
Japan and Germany where financial institution have significant control over firms. In some 
part of Western Europe Denins and McConnel (2003) revealed that family-ownership is very 
common. 
 In Non-OECD countries there are high ownership concentration but being developing 
countries introduction of sound corporate governance principle into the banking sector have 
not being possible because of poor legal protection, weak information disclosure requirement 
and dominant owners Arun and Turner (2002). Compared with OECD countries where there 
are better sound corporate governance principles in the banking sector. In addition, in most 
developing countries that are Non-OECD countries the banking sectors are not intermediate 
efficiently because of management performance and market structure compared with OECD 
countries with well developed financial intermediation.     
  
  Against this background, in this section the study classified the banks in each country 
to OECD and Non-OECD with OLS estimates of the empirical model using two alternative 
indices of bank capital structure, namely, liability ratio and equity ratio in addition bank 
performance indicator as return on asset (ROA) in OECD and Non-OECD countries. 
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Test 
Table 4a: Showing diagnostic test for table 4 
Liability (1) 
 
ROA (2) Equity (3) ROA (4) 
JB (normality)  3.96 511.79 64.09 455.48 
JB P-value 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ramsey’s 
RESET test 
 
 
0.86 (0.35) 
 
1.11 (0.29) 
 
20.12 (0.00) 
 
0.38 (0.54) 
Numbers in the parentheses refer to P-Value. 
 
The result of Jarque-Bera test (JB normality test ) from the above table show that for 
return on asset (ROA) with equity ratio  the p-value is significant, this indicates that the series 
are not following a normal distribution. This suggests that the data is non-normality. 
However, for liability ratio the p-value indicates insignificant, this confirmed with normality 
of the data. 
The Ramsey RESET test indicates diagnostic test shows that there are no 
misspecifications this because coefficients of the variable are not equal to zero. This suggest 
that the model is correctly specified, no omitted variables and there is correlation between 
explanatory variable (Independent variable) and error.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82 
 
 
Table 5. OLS Estimation of Bank Capital structure and Performance in OECD 
Countries and Non-OECD Countries. 
 
 
OECD Countries 
 
Non-OECD Countries 
 
Variable 
 
Liability 
(1) 
 
ROA 
(2) 
 
Equity 
(3) 
 
ROA 
(4) 
 
Liability 
(5) 
 
ROA 
(6) 
 
Equity 
(7) 
 
ROA 
(8) 
 
Intercepts 
0.894** 
0.038 
(23.837) 
0.095** 
0.021 
(4.534) 
0.070** 
0.016 
(4.379) 
-0.011 
0.007 
(-1.557) 
0.683** 
0.047 
(14.478) 
0.105** 
0.029 
(3.661) 
0.300** 
0.042 
(7.12) 
0.004 
0.013 
(0.333) 
 
Size 
0.004* 
0.002 
(1.806) 
6.96E 
0.000 
(0.018) 
-0.001 
0.001 
(-1.373) 
0.000 
0.000 
(0.404) 
0.016** 
0.003 
(5.483) 
-0.001 
0.001 
(-0.819) 
-0.015** 
0.003 
(-5.602) 
-0.001 
0.001 
(-0.826) 
 
ROA 
-1.706** 
0.439 
(-3.885) 
 
- 
1.124** 
0.251 
(4.487) 
 
- 
-1.269** 
0.003 
(-3.364) 
 
- 
0.899** 
0.320 
(2.810) 
 
- 
 
Liability 
 
- 
-0.090** 
0.021 
(-4.364) 
 
- 
  
- 
-0.099** 
0.033 
(-3.029) 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Equity 
  
- 
 
- 
0.315** 
0.063 
(5.004) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
0.003** 
0.040 
(2.826) 
Family is 
the 
controlling 
owner 
-0.000 
0.014 
(-0.017) 
0.004 
0.003 
(1.277) 
0.008 
0.006 
(1.391) 
0.000 
0.003 
(0.150) 
-0.012 
0.010 
(-1.167) 
0.004 
0.003 
(1.651) 
0.017* 
0.008 
(2.142) 
0.004 
0.003 
(1.314) 
 
Control 
exceeds 
cash flow 
rights  at 
10% 
0.033* 
0.014 
(2.427) 
0.005 
0.004 
(1.192) 
-0.012* 
0.005 
(-2.388) 
0.006 
0.004 
(1.440) 
-0.014 
0.009 
(-1.598) 
 
0.005* 
0.002 
(2.068) 
0.003 
0.008 
(0.406) 
0.006* 
0.002 
(2.599) 
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R 0.21 2 0.21 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.27 0.42 0.25 
F-statistic 7.54 7.62 19.80 19.01 16.68 9.11 18.17 8.47 
No of 
observation 
121 121 121 121 107 107 107 107 
No of  
countries 
23 23 23 23 21 21 21 21 
 
Dependent variable is leverage in term of liability and equity ratios and return on asset (ROA). Log(total assets) is size of bank. Family is the 
controlling owner is a dummy variable equal one if a family is the controlling shareholder and zero otherwise. Control exceeds cash flow (CEC) 
at 10% is equal to 1 if CEC at 10% is greater or equal to 2 and zero otherwise. 
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and Numbers in the 
parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
**significant at 1 per cent level. 
*significant at 5 per cent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity  is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
 
Table 5 columns 1 and 3 illustrate how family owner managed and control exceeds 
cash flow affect bank leverage in OECD countries. The result indicates that family owner 
managed is insignificant on bank leverage. This suggests that in OECD countries the family 
owner managed effect is not so important because ownership is more dispersed.  However, 
control exceeds cash flow rights have a positive significant effect on liability ratio and a 
negative significant effect on equity ratio. This implies that when controlling owner control 
rights exceeds cash flow they will depend more on debt financing rather on equity financing 
so that they will not lose control. This result is consistent with Table 3 result. 
In Table 5 columns 2 and 4 show how family owner managed firm and control 
exceeds cash flow affect return on assets (ROA). There is indication that the two variables are 
insignificant in OECD and Non-OECD countries. Moreover, liability has a negative 
significant effect on return on assets (ROA) while equity has a positive significant impact on 
return on asset (ROA). This show that when firm rely on liability the return on asset (ROA) 
may be lower and when they rely more on equity the return on asset (ROA) may be higher. 
However in Non-OECD countries control exceeds cash flow has a positive significant effect 
on return on asset (ROA).This suggests that when controlling owner control right exceeds 
cash flow rights the return on asset increased which show an indication of more performance. 
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Generally, return on assets (ROA) indicates the same effect on both liability and equity ratios. 
This finding is the same as indicated in Table 4  
Table 5 columns 5 and 7 illustrate the effect of family owner managed and control 
exceeds cash flow on bank leverage. The result show that family owner managed firm have a 
positive significant effect with equity ratio this indicate that in  Non-OECD countries family 
owner managed firm rely more on equity financing. This result is consistent with Table 3 
result. However in case of control exceeds cash flow there is evidence of insignificant 
relationship on bank leverage.     
  Table 5a: Showing diagnostic test for table 
 
5    
Test 
OECD Countries Non-OECD Countries 
Liability 
(1) 
ROA 
(2) 
Equity 
(3) 
ROA 
(4) 
Liability 
(5) 
ROA 
(6) 
Equity 
(7) 
ROA 
(8) 
JB Test 9.96 1362.35 6.56 1210.43 0.23 51.18 0.98 58.32 
JB P-Value 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.61 0.00 
Ramsey’s 
RESET test 
 
3.55 
(0.06) 
5.65 
(0.02) 
3.60 
(0.06) 
11.07 
(0.00) 
4.21 
(0.04) 
0.95 
(0.33) 
10.53 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.90) 
Numbers in the parentheses refer to P-Value. 
 
The result of Jarque-Bera test (JB normality test) from the above table show that for return on 
asset (ROA) the p-value is significant, this indicates that the series are not following a normal 
distribution. This suggests that the data is non-normality. However, for liability ratio and 
equity ratio the p-value indicates insignificant, this confirmed with normality of the data. 
The Ramsey RESET test indicates diagnostic test shows that there are no misspecifications 
this because coefficients of the variable are not equal to zero. This suggest that the model is 
correctly specified, no omitted variables and there is correlation between explanatory variable 
(Independent variable) and error.   
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4.4 OLS Estimation of Bank Capital structure and Performance in Asia countries. 
   Classens et.al (2000) found that in most East Asia countries there is ownership 
concentrated and control is enhanced through pyramid structures and cross holding among 
firms with family as controlling owner.  Consequently, in this section the paper investigate 
the effect of family-ownership and control exceeds cash flow rights on bank leverage OLS 
estimate to show how family owner managed and control exceeds cash flow affect bank 
leverage and performance.  
  
Table 6. OLS Estimate of Bank Capital Structure and Performance in Asia Countries. 
Variable 
 
Liability 
(1) 
 
ROA 
(2) 
 
Equity 
(3) 
 
ROA 
(4) 
 
Intercepts 
0.719** 
0.068 
(10.576) 
0.076** 
0.027 
(2.766) 
0.261** 
0.054 
(4.852) 
0.012 
0.015 
(0.773) 
 
Size 
0.015** 
0.004 
(3.468) 
-0.001 
0.001 
(-1.126) 
-0.012** 
0.003 
-3.701) 
-0.001 
0.001 
(-1.173) 
 
ROA 
-0.910* 
0.407 
(-2.233) 
 
- 
 
0.567* 
0.265 
(2.141) 
 
- 
Liability  
- 
-0.064* 
0.032 
(-2.027) 
 
- 
 
- 
Equity  
- 
 
- 
 
- 
0.071* 
0.037 
(1.949) 
Family is the 
controlling 
owner 
-0.022* 
0.013 
(-1.776) 
0.006* 
0.003 
(1.862) 
0.022* 
0.009 
(2.439) 
0.006* 
0.003 
(1.772) 
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Control 
exceeds cash 
flow rights 
-0.030* 
0.011 
(-2.615) 
0.005* 
0.002 
(2.122) 
0.014 
0.012 
(1.187) 
0.006* 
0.002 
(2.540) 
 
R
 
2 
 
 
0.32 
 
 
 
 
0.21 
 
 
 
 
0.33 
 
 
 
0.19 
F-statistic 8.42  
4.62 
 
8.70 
 
4.19 
No of 
observation 
 
 
75 
 
75 
 
75 
 
75 
No of 
countries 
12 12 12 12 
 
 Dependent variable is leverage in term of liability and equity ratios and return on asset (ROA). Size of bank is the   Log(total 
assets) which served as a control variable.  Family is the controlling owner is a dummy variable equal one if a family is the controlling 
shareholder and zero otherwise. Control exceeds cash flow (CEC) at 10% is equal to 1 if CEC at 10% is greater or equal to 2 and zero 
otherwise. 
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and Numbers in the 
parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
**significant at 1 per cent level. 
*significant at 5 per cent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity  is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors 
  Table 6 columns 1 and 3 present effect of family owner managed firm and control 
exceeds cash flow on bank leverage. There is evidence of negative significant effect of family 
owner managed firm on liability ratio and a positive significant effect on equity ratio. This 
suggests that in Asia countries family owner managed firms prefer higher leverage by rely 
more on equity financing rather than debt financing. This result is consistent with Table 3. In 
addition, control exceeds cash flow rights have a negative significant relationship with 
liability ratio and insignificant effect with equity ratio. This implies that when controlling 
owner control right exceeds cash flow rights the firms prefer lower bank leverage by rely less 
on debt financing so that they will not lose control if they rely on equity.   
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Table 6 columns 2 and 4 contain information on how family owner managed firm and 
control exceeds cash flow rights influences performance. There are indications that these two 
variables have positive significant effect on return on assets (ROA). This indicates in Asia 
countries the family owner managed firms and when control exceeds cash flow rights the 
bank performed better.          
Moreover, the effect of both liability and equity ratio on return on assets (ROA) show 
that liability have a negative effect on return on assets while equity have a positive significant 
impact on return on assets (ROA). This suggests as the banks in Asia countries have a higher 
return on assets their debt financing continue to be lower. However when equity financing 
increases the return on assets (ROA) also increases. In addition, return on asset (ROA) has 
the same significant effect on liability and equity.   This result is consistent with results in 
Table 4 and 5 of this study.      
 
Test 
Table 6a: Showing diagnostic test for table 6 
Liability 
(1) 
ROA 
(2) 
Equity 
(3) 
ROA 
(4) 
JB 
(Normality) 
1.20 53.94 1.90 56.04 
JB P-Value 0.55 0.00 0.39 0.00 
Ramsey’s 
RESET test 
 
0.83 
(0.37) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
1.07 
 (0.30) 
0.40 
(0.53) 
Numbers in the parentheses refer to P-Value. 
 
The result of Jarque-Bera test (JB normality test) from the above table show that for 
return on asset (ROA) the p-value is significant, this indicates that the series are not following 
a normal distribution. This suggests that the data is non-normality. However, for liability ratio 
and equity ratio the p-value indicates insignificant, this confirmed that the series have normal 
distribution of the data. 
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The Ramsey RESET test that indicates the diagnostic test shows that there are no 
misspecifications this because coefficients of the variable are not equal to zero. This suggest 
that the model is correctly specified, no omitted variables and there is correlation between 
explanatory variable (Independent variable) and error.   
 
4.5 Conclusion  
This paper provides empirical results to show important characteristics of the prevalent 
ownership structure around the world by reveals the effect of family-owner managed firms and 
control exceeds cash flow rights on bank capital structure. Based on the evidence from the 
study, family owner managed firms prefer bank with more equity financing than debt 
financing as a result  of  a  positive relationship between family-owner managed and equity. 
This suggests that family-owner managed firms prefer lower leverage in term of debt, by 
injecting more equity and minimised the level of liability. This analysis also implies that 
family owner-manage firms believed in firm survival by having strong equity to assets base so 
that they can pass firm on to their heirs. The above finding is applicable to banks in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America countries in relative to banks in OECD countries as show in Table 3 
and 4. In addition for bank in Asia countries as a case study also give the same evidence with 
reference to Table 6. However in OECD countries there is insignificant effect of family owner 
managed firm on bank leverage but in Non-OECD countries the family owner managed have a 
significant effect by rely more on equity financing as indicated in Table 5  
Moreover, the study also examine the relationship that occur when control rights of the 
controlling owner  exceeds cash flow rights and bank leverage and it has a negative  
significant  effect on bank leverage using equity ratio as indicator for bank leverage. However, 
using liability ratio as indicator for bank leverage there is a positive significant effect. This 
suggests when control right of the controlling owner exceeds cash flow rights, the equity is 
lower and they prefer debt financing because of fear of losing control. This result is consistent 
for banks in Asia, Africa and Latin America countries relative to OECD countries but with 
weak significant effect on bank leverage as indicated in Table 3. Furthermore, for bank in 
OECD countries there is a strong significant effect of control exceeds cash flow on bank 
leverage compared with bank in Non-OECD countries does not have significant effect on bank 
leverage with reference to Table 5.  
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However, in Asia countries as a case study control rights exceeds cash flow rights have 
a significant effect on bank leverage by rely more on equity financing rather than debt as 
shows in Table 6.  Generally family owner managed and control exceeds cash flow rights   
have a positive effect on performance indicator (ROA) for banks  Asia, Africa and Latin 
America with reference category (relative ) to bank in  OECD countries and also same 
evidence for  banks in Asia countries as a case study.   
4.6 Policy implication 
Higher control rights may give rise to serious agency problem and this associated 
with over reliance on debt due to controlling shareholders being unwilling to dilute their 
ownership for fear of losing control. Rather controlling shareholders may prefer firms   to 
use more debt since debt holders have no voting rights.  However, in this study there is 
evidence that when controlling owner control rights exceeds cash flow rights they  may 
rely more on debt (liability)  financing  with higher  return on assets increase (ROA). 
Consequently, controlling shareholders and management of the banks should not allow 
excessive building up of bank leverage through debt (liability) level as excessive leverage 
may be one of the reasons for current financial crisis.  
In addition, in a family-owner managed firms they should be involved more to a 
certain level of risk taking because from the above evidence when a family owner managed 
firm rely on debt the return on asset (ROA) is more higher, but if they rely on equity there 
is no significant effect especially bank in Non- OECD countries relative to banks in OECD 
countries. As a result, this may improved the financial intermediation of bank in Non-
OECD.    
Moreover, the regulators should consider the measure to control bank leverage by 
including leverage ratio in pillar 2 as part of indicator for monitoring bank supervision in 
order to avoid excessive bank leverage. Also the regulators should be mandatory the bank 
with optimal capital structure that indicates a balance between the proportion of debt 
(liability) and equity hold. This will also allow the bank not to build up excessive leverage. 
Furthermore, the improvement of governing of banks depends on debt because investors 
use debt to generate information and monitor the management. Therefore, there is need for 
tighten capital requirement which will reduce the risk of bank failure.   
 
90 
 
4.7 Limitation of the study.  
One of the weaknesses of this study is   that there are no enough bank data from 
Africa and Latin America and this may hindered the results of the study. In addition, the level 
of ownership structure and control affect capital structure may depend on quality of banking 
system, the legal and judiciary protection of different shareholders, EPS, value and role of 
regulatory authority these are issues for future study. 
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